The Cipher Brief spoke with expert Norman T. Roule, who served for 34-years in the Central Intelligence Agency, managing programs related to Iran and the Middle East, about what the killing means for the organization. Roule also served as the National Intelligence Manager for Iran (NIM-I) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from November 2008 until September 2017.
First, read the brief. Then, engage with Roule during a private briefing for Cipher Brief members, Wednesday, December 9 at 1:30p ET. Members receive registration links via email. Become a member here.
The Cipher Brief: What should we take away from reports that the United States and Israel cooperated in the killing of Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah) aka Muhammad Masri), al-Qaeda's second-in-command, in Tehran?
Roule: First, the U.S. and its partners have developed an extraordinarily successful capacity to locate and kill AQ's senior most leadership. We see almost monthly reports that we or our partners have eliminated AQ seniors in some of the most demanding operating environments ever confronted by intelligence professionals and warfighters.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
We should be proud of the collaboration within the U.S. government and among our foreign partners that make this success possible. We should also remember that such operations are being conducted in a wide array of geographies, many of which involve significant risks to our personnel. In the case of Masri, Iran is a challenging operating environment. Nonetheless, those involved in this operation were apparently able to locate, surveil, and kill one of the most sophisticated and security-conscious terrorists on the planet.
Masri's death also highlights that the founding generation of AQ is rapidly leaving the scene. Only Sayf al-Adel and Ayman Zawahiri remain of AQ's old guard, and many believe Zawahiri may be dead or dying. We should think about what this means as a younger generation, with different experience and drivers, takes the helm of an increasingly fragmented AQ. What will this rising leadership do to assert the group's relevance and attract followers, many of whom may have been drawn to ISIS following the death of Osama bin Laden?
Finally, Iran continues to allow AQ leaders the ability to move freely in Tehran. Such liberty probably translates into some degree of operational capability that the world ignores at its peril. We should all ask why the international community tolerates Iran's relationship with a terrorist group responsible for killing and wounding the citizens of so many countries as well as providing the ideological foundation for ISIS and other terrorist groups?
The Cipher Brief: Press reports cite sources saying Masri's daughter died in the attack. What impact will this have on AQ?
Roule: Masri's 27-year-old daughter Mariam was the widow of Osama bin Laden's son Hamza, who was himself killed in a reported U.S. counterterrorism operation in the past few years. Mariam was not likely to become the leader of AQ. Still, it is possible that Masri was grooming her to play some role in the group's leadership, perhaps in the recruitment and handling of female operatives. Notably, she married Hamza bin Laden in Iran.
The Cipher Brief: What message does the killing of Abu Mohammed al- Masri send to Iran?
Roule: I think Iran will take two messages from the killing of Abu Masri. First, the U.S. and Israel have enormous capabilities. Tehran will likely consider this incident in light of the U.S. killing of IRGC General Qassem Soleimani; Israel's widely publicized seizure of Iran's nuclear weapons program documentation; reports of explosions at an Iranian nuclear site; and the death of Iranian official Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Together, these incidents message that there is little Iran can do to hide from the West and, when necessary, the U.S. and Israel can neutralize Iranian threats with almost surgical precision.
Unfortunately, the lack of international reaction to Abu Masri's presence in Iran will tell Iran that its relationship with AQ is not a priority for the international community. For this reason, Iran will likely continue its AQ relationship, but may increase security for its remaining AQ detainees and contacts in Iran.
The Cipher Brief: What do we know about Iran's relationship with AQ?
Roule: Iran's relationship with AQ is complicated and extends back to the 1990s. Suffice to say that it has been significant to the survival of AQ. Following the attacks on Afghanistan after 9/11, Iran knowingly allowed vast numbers of AQ operatives to transit its territory to escape capture. In only a few cases did Iran inform authorities of this travel. Iran also provided a safe haven to the AQ leadership council during this timeframe, detaining this group only after significant international pressure. Iran could have transformed its relationship with the West had it turned these individuals over to their home countries or to Interpol. Indeed, this decision would have saved countless lives and treasure lost in the global War on Terror.
After considerable pressure, Tehran detained the AQ leadership council and their families but rejected calls to hand them over to international authorities. Some believe that it refused to do so out of fear that AQ would reveal its cooperation with Iran. Others believe that Iran hoped to use the detained AQ leaders to discourage AQ attacks against Iran itself. In any case, Tehran allowed AQ to facilitate operations from its territory. Iran gradually loosened restrictions on AQ detainees, which likely allowed them to re-engage in some operational activity. Iran also released some of these detainees, many of whom renewed their terrorist activities, especially in Syria and Afghanistan.
Norman T. Roule, Former National Intelligence Manager for Iran, ODNI
Too often, discussions on this history focus on whether the Iranian relationship with AQ is strategic or tactical, why Shi'a Iran would aid Sunni extremists, or whether Tehran is fully aware of what Iran-based operatives undertake. I find these debates a bit frustrating. For almost two decades, the world has had considerable evidence that Iran enabled and continues to enable AQ fundraising, the travel of AQ operatives, and provides safe haven to its first generation of leadership. Iran's leadership responds to protests with denials but has allowed the relationship to continue. The international community's failure to act against Iran is a stain on the memory of the victims of 9/11 and those killed and wounded by AQ since that terrible day.
The Cipher Brief: How does the death of Masri fit into recent successes against AQ's leadership?
Roule: The death of Masri is the latest in a series of significant successes against AQ's leadership throughout Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
- In early November, Afghan authorities announced that they had killed Pakistani national Mohammad Hanif, a key AQ leader, and bomb trainer. Hanif was a senior member of al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). In late October, Afghan security forces killed AQIS senior Husam Abd-al-Ra'uf, one of AQ's most experienced and capable leaders. A close associate of AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, Ra'uf's work with AQ began in the 1980s.
- Despite the drawdown of U.S. forces in Syria, U.S. counterterrorism operations there have been robust. In mid-October, American forces reportedly killed a handful of AQ leaders in Idlib, Syria. Among the dead was Abu Mohammed al-Sudani, a seasoned terrorist close to Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. In September, a drone attack killed Hurras Al Deen leader Sayyaf al-Tunsi in Idlib. In June, a drone attack eliminated Khaled al-Aruri, the leader of the AQ affiliate Guardians of the Religion. Aruri's history with AQ began in the 1990s. He operated in Iran following 9/11 and was held by Tehran until 2015 when Iran allegedly released him in a prisoner exchange.
- Yemen was the site of another AQ defeat. In February, U.S. forces killed Qasim al-Raymi, a confidante of Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri, who later helped establish and led AQ in the Arabian Peninsula.
- Africa has also been the scene of hammer blows against AQ. In June of this year, French military forces killed Algerian AQ leader Abdelmalek Droukdal in Mali. An acolyte of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Droukdal fought in Afghanistan before returning to Algeria, where he joined the relatively-unsuccessful Algerian terrorist group Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. He reportedly introduced suicide bombing attacks and encouraged their merger with AQ. In January 2007, this group renamed itself AQ in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and he became its leader for more than a decade. During the following years, AQIM became a reliable ideological ally of AQ and one of its most lethal offshoots in the region. AQIM suffered from factionalism, but it understood the need to build alliances with local terrorist groups to expand its regional influence.
The Cipher Brief: Given the killing of much of al Qaeda's old guard, what do you think about the next phase of AQ's evolution?
Roule: AQ has evolved into a decentralized organization that consists of ideologically sympathetic groups that derive their authority less from the uncharismatic Ayman Zawahiri and more from their ability to build alliances with local actors motivated by poor governance, ethnic strife, and insurgencies. Zawahiri and AQ leaders in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan play a crucial role in terms of ideological cohesion and sometimes organization, but they increasingly defer to local leaders to develop their power base. In the future, AQ offshoots will instead operate under a new generation of leaders, sometimes with significantly destructive capabilities, but who draw their strength from an alliance with local actors enabled by insurgents.
A good example of the above would be how AQIM responded to the death of Abdelmalek Droukdel. In Droukdel's place, AQIM installed his former aid and Algerian national Abu Ubayda Yousef al Aanabi. Aanabi's experience, especially in media and propaganda, will be valuable to the organization, but his operational capabilities are less clear. I expect the factionalism that has plagued AQIM will further test his skills.
The Cipher Brief: What do you anticipate as the most significant challenges policymakers will face going forward with regard to AQ?
Roule: Policymakers should consider an interagency review of how best to achieve two goals: maintain pressure on AQ and ISIS and continue a global counter-extremism program. A significant factor in this policy will be the need to shift counterterrorism resources against China and other state targets. Policymakers will also need to enhance cooperation with key partners.
Policymakers will contend with the problem of success: we have essentially destroyed AQ. The group's remnants remain a lethal threat, but we must tailor our approach to respond to a decentralized structure operating in different (and much larger) geographies. If the war against terrorism taught us anything, it is that none of us are as strong as all of us together. This paradigm has particular importance in this new dynamic.
Our new approach will likely involve a blend of diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic levers. The use of Special Forces to work by, with, and through regional partners, and in concert with European allies, will likely remain important. The continued use of drones and other advanced military technologies will help us minimize our footprint and minimize civilian casualties.
The next phase of this challenge will probably involve different strategies. Dealing with AQ in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be quite different from our approach against AQ in the vast, weakly-governed spaces of Africa. In particular, the latter will demand a whole-of-government approach to improve political and economic stability in areas where AQ exploits local grievances to gain adherents. Again, working with European and other partners will be critical. Finally, we must compel Iran to end its involvement with AQ and transfer the remaining al-Qai'da operatives in Iran to international authorities.
Now that you’ve read the brief, engage in a private virtual briefing with Norm Roule on Wednesday, December 9 at 1:30p ET. Cipher Brief members will receive registration details via email.
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