The Cipher Brief turned to our expert Tim Willasey-Wilsey, former senior British diplomat and now Senior Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College, London for his take on the rising tensions.
In early May Chinese troops made incursions into Indian territory at two high-altitude locations along India’s long northern border; one in Ladakh and the other in Sikkim over 1,000km to the east. These violations did not happen by chance. In one case Chinese troops were reported to be armed with batons, suggesting that they were keen to avoid any fatalities which might spark a conflict. So, what is China trying to achieve?
The history of the border disputes on the “roof of the world” (a Victorian term which embraces the key mountain ranges in the area; the Pamirs, the Karakorum, the Hindu Kush, and the Himalaya) need not unduly concern us. Various agreements between Britain and China and later, India and China narrowed the disputed area substantially but not quite enough to prevent war in 1962.
In its victory over India in that war, China secured its territorial ambitions in the area. In fact, China’s withdrawal from some of the ground it had captured surprised India and the United States at the time. There had been real anxiety in New Delhi that China might push on towards the oil fields of Assam.
We can be confident, therefore, that these new incursions are not about territorial claims. They are about pressure. It suits China to keep a suite of disputes unresolved in the same way that Vladimir Putin uses the conflict in the Donbass to regulate pressure on Ukraine.
A perfect example of this policy was in evidence when Chinese President Xi Jinping made his first official visit to India in September 2014. To coincide with his visit, there was an intrusion by a large force of Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Ladakh. Diplomatic observers were baffled and speculated that this must be a case of a low-level commander being unaware of the bigger political picture.
However, the size of the force and the length of the intrusion subverted this theory. It gradually dawned on New Delhi that the events were actually coordinated; to send a message that this should not be seen as a relationship of equals. If India wants an economic relationship with China, there is a political price-tag attached. One of India’s top sinologists interpreted the signals to a bewildered Indian government.
Tim Willasey-Wilsey, Former Senior Member, British Foreign Office
Former Senior Member of the British Foreign Office
China’s actions in the Himalaya over the past month are drawn from the same playbook. They are intended to send a message exclusively to India. It is up to India to work out the rationale behind the intimidation. There are four reasons why Xi Beijing would wish to do this now.
The first is to dissuade Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi from developing his relationship with the United States and the other so-called Quad nations Japan and Australia. Xi knows that Indians still retain many of their non-aligned sentiments and are also anxious about committing to a US which seems increasingly erratic and self-obsessed.
Modi has always been keen to avoid confrontation with China. His instincts are mainly economic and commercial, and he maintained close relations with China when he was Chief Minister of Gujerat. Since becoming Prime Minister, he has invested heavily in his relationship with Xi including summits in Wuhan (2018) and Chennai (2019). China may calculate that Modi will be reluctant to endanger all those years of engagement.
Secondly, this pressure on Modi could be particularly useful now that India has taken over the chair of the World Health Organisation (WHO) Executive Board for a 3-year term. India will be well-placed to influence the terms of any enquiry into the origins of the Covid-19 virus. There is also the separate question about whether Taiwan should be a participant at the World Health Assembly. China will take an impenetrable line on both issues and thus its warning-shot in the Himalaya is well-timed.
A third reason may relate to India’s continued acceptance of the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan followers in India. China recognises that Tibet could provide the West with an opportunity for destabilisation if relations were to deteriorate into a Cold War. For this reason, the question of who will succeed the 85-year-old spiritual leader is a matter of considerable importance to Beijing. China wishes to appoint its own choice who would remain firmly under Chinese control inside Tibet. It will not tolerate a rival external candidate.
Tim Willasey-Wilsey, Former Senior Member, British Foreign Office
Former Senior Member of the British Foreign Office
Finally, China may be signalling India to back off from its renewed claims to Gilgit Baltistan, one of two parts of the former state of Kashmir which is under de facto Pakistani control. This may explain why the Chinese press has been talking about a new territorial claim to the Galwan Valley, which is towards the Pakistani end of India’s 3,500km border with China. Again, this is unlikely to be coincidence.
China has long been anxious about the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) crossing the disputed territory of Gilgit-Baltistan even though India’s claim to the region has not been a live political issue for many years. But since India’s abrogation of Article 370, Kashmir’s simmering dispute is back on the boil and India’s wider claims have been more voluble. In early May, the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) started to broadcast weather reports for Gilgit-Baltistan in India in what was called “subtle diplomacy”.
The announcement of the new Diamer-Bhasha dam in Gilgit-Baltistan has provoked fresh Indian protests. The dam on the Indus will be used both for generating electricity and storing water. Pakistan needs the power and water. China needs to be sure that its investment and workers will be safe. So, both parties want India to rein in its ambitions and its rhetoric.
Modi now faces an agonising decision. The hawks in his security establishment will be arguing for a firm line; otherwise China will keep coming back for more. But Modi’s record on China suggests he will seek an accommodation with Xi.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspectives and analysis in The Cipher Brief.
