EXPERT INTERVIEW – As the world trains its focus on the headlines about Ukraine — the U.S. pivot to Russia, the pause on American support to Ukraine, the U.S.-Ukraine ceasefire proposal, and Russia’s next move – tensions in hotspots elsewhere have continued to simmer.
This is especially true in the South China Sea. The early weeks of 2025 have seen a rise in harsh rhetoric and confrontation in the area, specifically between China and the Philippines. In February, a Chinese navy helicopter flew within 10 feet of a Philippine patrol plane over the contested Scarborough Shoal, in an attempt to force the Philippine aircraft out of China-claimed airspace. The same month, China claimed it had successfully driven away three Philippine planes “illegally” flying over the disputed Spratly Islands.
China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan all hold territorial claims in the South China Sea. The strategic waterway is highly coveted — a significant amount of global maritime trade passes through it, and these waters and their seabed are rich in natural resources, from fisheries to oil and gas reserves. Beyond the strategic issues in play, there are questions of principle; five of those claimants believe China is encroaching on their territorial waters.
In the recent encounters with China, the Philippines’ allies have been brought into the fray. Philippine and U.S. forces conducted joint patrols in the area in early February, prompting Beijing to issue a warning and conduct its own patrols in response. In March, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited the Philippines to reiterate Britain and the Philippines’ commitment to a rules-based international order. China warned that he was “provoking tensions.”
The Cipher Brief spoke with retired Rear Admiral Rommel Jude Ong, who served as Vice Commander of the Philippine Navy and is now a professor at the Ateneo School of Government in Manila, to assess the current situation.
“The problem we have is that China has escalation dominance over the Philippines, driven by disparity or asymmetry in capabilities and, of course, their superiority in numbers,” Rear Admiral Ong said. He added that any support from allies has limited effect, given the fleeting nature of their presence. “Even if our allies and partners are coming to the Philippines, they visit but they leave,” Rear Admiral Ong said. “They're there for some period of time, but it's not a sustained presence.” He also acknowledged concerns about the strength of the American commitment, as the Trump Administration calls multiple longstanding relationships into question.
Rear Admiral Ong spoke with Cipher Brief Editor/Writer Ethan Masucol. Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Editor’s note: Rear Admiral Ong described the waterway the West Philippine Sea, the name the Philippines uses as an assertion of its sovereignty and territorial claims there.
The Cipher Brief: There's been a recent spike in hostile and even violent confrontations between the Philippines and China. Could you give us a temperature check? What is the situation like right now?
RADM Ong: We might be deceived by the seemingly relatively calm situation over the past few months. But incrementally, the actions of China are taken to expand their position. The recent spike you mentioned for the past few weeks, we've been trying to discern the driver of that. My personal view is, it has to do with the fact that we just recently passed two very important laws: one is the maritime zones law, and the other one is the archipelagic sea lanes law. Those laws provide a sort of a legal foundation for our maritime interests in the West Philippine Sea as well as the surrounding waters in the Philippine archipelago, as well as how we define the activities along our seven archipelagic straits. My personal view is that China is reacting to these two laws, and they've been vocal about it. The uptick of Coast Guard and naval patrols close to our territorial waters is, I think, their attempt to test our fortitude and our ability to actually enforce those two laws.
The other incident that is more telling is that there was this [Chinese] surface action group that entered Mindoro Strait, and a few days later, we found them doing gunner exercises in Australia. So they passed through Mindoro Strait and through the southern straits of the Philippine archipelago, then towards Indonesia, then Australia. These are very significant developments that don't affect only the Philippines, but other countries in the region.
The Cipher Brief:What are you looking for that might either tamp down the tensions — or lead to further escalation?
RADM Ong: I think de-escalation is not in their language. They will escalate. The problem we have is that China has escalation dominance over the Philippines, driven by disparity or asymmetry in capabilities and, of course, their superiority in numbers, when we look at the forces at play in the West Philippine Sea.
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The Cipher Brief: You mentioned it's not just a Philippines problem. Can you talk about how you're getting support from allies and what more you may need?
RADM Ong: We do value the international support from different countries in Europe and within the region. It affirms our position that what we're doing is right and is consistent with the international order, and that we have the moral [position] in terms of pursuing our maritime interests, within the limits of what is just and proper as a state.
However, it has its limitations. These words of support, sometimes backed up by naval visits, naval exercises, they're well and good; in terms of strategic signaling, they are very important in amplifying the determination of our strategic partners in supporting our cause. However, when you look at it from the nitty-gritty of the exercise of hard power, it has its limitations. When you calculate the battle-space effect of these actions, for all intents and purposes, China has well asserted its sea control of the West Philippine Sea. It has developed the ability to build ships to modernize its navy and its coast guard, and concentrated this unified maritime force in the West Philippine Sea, which gives them that edge in terms of sea control.
Now the challenge for the Philippines is, of course, that we have limitations. We will never have the capacity to actually have a significant effect on challenging sea control. But the problem is that even if our allies and partners are coming to the Philippines, they visit but they leave. They're there for some period of time, but it's not a sustained presence. When you're dealing with swarms of [Chinese] Coast Guard vessels or swarms of militia vessels that are just shifting their positions across different islands and features in the West Philippine Sea, then you have these transitory partners coming in but leaving at some point in time — so the condition is still the same. The assertion of sea control of China has not been challenged sufficiently, from my point of view.
It begs the question: what do we need to do to actually have a sufficient deterrent effect on the situation?
To me, the fundamental problem started [in 2015] — and it's based on a U.S. Congressional Research Service report, which said that as early as 2015, the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) Navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in terms of combatant vessels. That's in 2015. The disparity has increased, because the U.S. Navy has been decommissioning major vessel classes for the past few years. And if you look at President [Donald] Trump's recent policy guidelines to the Navy, I think his marching order to the Secretary of Navy is shipbuilding, shipbuilding, shipbuilding. And he has even created an office in the White House itself to look at shipbuilding capability, which is basically restoring the U.S. maritime industrial capacity for shipbuilding, which it has lost over a period of years.
Now, this cannot be done overnight. And even if, let's say, President Trump starts building ships today, I don't think that disparity or asymmetry in numbers [with China] can be resolved within his term, given that there is still a backlog of various types of vessels for the U.S. Navy that has not been completed.
So this is a fundamental problem. Even if the U.S. would wholeheartedly try to support us or the region, the fundamentals make it impossible for them to actually keep their word, unless they solve that industrial capacity question or problem. We're looking at maybe four, five, six, seven years down the road when the balance can be restored. So this is something that the U.S. has to work on, but it affects us because the net effect is it created an imbalance of regional naval power in East Asia.
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The Cipher Brief: You've seen the U.S. shake up its transatlantic alliances with Europe. How is the Philippines looking at its alliance with the United States?
RADM Ong: I think the temperature here is still OK. There were some words of affirmation coming in from the U.S. DoD and the U.S. State Department regarding the value of the alliance.
My own personal understanding is that Trump is trying to find a way to win away Russia from China, to sort of break up the China-Russia axis. And unfortunately or fortunately, wherever you're sitting, whichever side of the table you're sitting, Ukraine is in the middle of that spot that you don't want to be in. And I think President Trump is trying to do an exit strategy not only for Europe or Ukraine – he is also looking at an exit strategy for the Middle East. And if he succeeds, then he can focus his attention on the Indo-Pacific. Some colleagues in academia from Europe say it's not going to work — Russia will not just break off from China overnight. The conditions during the time of Nixon and Kissinger are totally different from the conditions that Russia and China have now. So some don't buy the idea of breaking off the China-Russia partnership, assuming that is Trump's game plan.
My other take is that even assuming that this is the grand strategy at play, I still haven't heard from the White House or from DoD or the State Department what the shaping of their Indo-Pacific strategy is. So far, what I'm hearing is just about Taiwan and transferring its chips capability from Taiwan to Arizona. And lately, President Trump was looking at the asymmetry of commitment between the U.S. and Japan in terms of their alliance.
It doesn't sound good. When you bring together what's happening in Ukraine and not getting the big picture here in the Pacific, the optics are bad. We just hope that it doesn't encourage China to be more adventurous in its actions.
Fortunately, from the Philippine side, the sentiment I'm getting is that they're still positive with regards to the U.S.-Philippine alliance. But on the academic side, from those outside government, we've been looking at an alternative regional security architecture outside of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. We're looking at alternative multilaterals, like a combination with Japan or with Australia or maybe with Canada, not only on the security-defense side, but also looking at how we look at economic resilience as well — because China operates not at the geopolitical sphere but rather at the geoeconomics sphere.
The Cipher Brief:You've given the U.S. a lot of homework, so to speak, for its Indo-Pacific strategy.
RADM Ong: From the Philippine side, we wish the U.S. well in terms of catching up, because they have to do a lot of catching up. And we do need that big picture as far as the Indo-Pacific is concerned because right now we don't see it.
My personal view is that we're not going to wait until the U.S. does its homework, because we need to look at how to mitigate a potential U.S. reduction of exposure or commitment in the region. We're looking for our own Plan B, just in case.
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