After a presidential campaign peppered with accusations of inadequate burden-sharing by Japan in its security relationship with the United States, President Donald Trump has attempted to calm fears of a U.S. retreat from its old ally. In February, the President hosted Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the White House and at his Florida golf resort, Mar a Lago, while the new U.S. Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, took time to visit Japan and meet with his counterpart, Defense Minister Tomomi Inada. After this reset in relations, Cipher Brief Analyst Fritz Lodge spoke with Kuni Miyake, President of the Tokyo-based Foreign Policy Institute to discuss the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance under this new administration.
The Cipher Brief: In your mind, how have the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) changed under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe?
Kuni Miyake: He didn’t specifically change the JSDF program per se, but he is more willing to enable Japan to defend itself and to strengthen the Japan-U.S. security alliance, particularly in the southern maritime theater. Mr. Abe seems to be putting more emphasis on the amphibious units and their ability to defend remote islands in the south. And this is something that he has been doing quite successfully.
TCB: How has the security legislation reinterpreting the ability to use military force in the name of “collective self-defense,” which was passed in 2015, changed the way that the JSDF can operate?
KM: Constitutionally, you’re talking about partially exercising the right to collective self-defense under the current interpretation of the constitution. We are talking about some hypothetical situations where we might be able to exercise the right to collective self-defense, but there are some conditions attached. At this moment, we do not see any clear and present danger or crisis where we might have to resort to that.
It is now legally possible for us to exercise that limited right to collective self-defense, but I think this is still just about preparing ourselves for future contingencies. At this particular moment, I do not see any specific change in the activities of the JSDF.
TCB: How could the ability to act in collective self-defense affect the U.S.-Japan alliance?
KM: Well, it’s a situational concept. If a crisis arises, then we may be involved. In a situation in which U.S. forces are attacked in some way, then we might resort to this right for collective self-defense, but so far, we haven’t reached that level yet.
TCB: In your mind, what are the most important pillars of the U.S.-Japan security treaty?
KM: I no longer speak for the government, but I can tell you how I see the world as a strategic thinker. There are three revisionist powers on the Eurasian continent. One is Russia, the second is China, and the third is potentially Iran. For the most part, there is strategic depth between these revisionist powers and the United States—and even the West in general. Russia is a problem for Europe, but it is not the most serious due to the strategic depth of NATO and the EU, and the size of the European continent as a whole. In the case of Iran, the threat is real but it is not the most imminent, because you have the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and North Africa acting as a buffer zone to Europe.
However, in the case of East Asia, most of the U.S. allies there are maritime states or island states. The main exception is the Korean peninsula. They have no strategic depth because they are surrounded by water. If the U.S. were to lose its allies in East Asia, Americans would have to retreat all the way back to Hawaii and Guam. So, whether you like it or not, the U.S. relies heavily on its allies in this part of the world, and we need to work together to deter revisionist powers in East Asia. China might logically present the most serious long term threat to the U.S.and its allies in the region, and it seems to me that American alliances in this part of world will become more valuable than ever before.
The U.S. government seems to be aware of the potential danger in East Asia. This region of the world’s fastest growing economies will be as important as other theaters in the Middle East or Europe.
TCB: President Trump talked a lot about the lack of burden-sharing in U.S. alliances, that U.S. allies were not paying their fair share for U.S. security guarantees, and Japan was often mentioned in those comments. Have you been heartened by Prime Minister Abe’s recent visit to Washington and Mar-a-Lago and the comments that were made there?
KM: I would say that Mr. Trump’s rhetoric during the campaign is something he did in his campaign mode. He should now be governing, and I think that the result of the summit meetings between Trump and Abe in Washington and Florida are the best example that, as far as Japan-U.S. relations are concerned, Mr. Trump seems to be more in the governing mode than in campaign mode.
I am neither alarmed nor worried about it. And I don’t think that we are going to have more troubles over issues of burden-sharing or stationing costs for U.S. troops in Japan. That is not the issue any more. That was campaign rhetoric. Because, if Japan paid 100 percent, then the U.S. troops would essentially be our mercenaries, and Japan would want its own chain of command over them, which the United States would of course deny.
The real question is how we jointly increase our deterrent power as status quo maritime nations in this part of the world? This is something we need to discuss further, but I am optimistic about that process.
TCB: On defense specifically, how do you see the relationship between U.S. Defense Minister James Mattis and Japanese Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada after Mattis’ visit to Japan?
KM: Minister Inada is a “new kid in town,” while General Mattis is a seasoned, experienced soldier. So it will take time. But as long as Mr. Abe is in command, I don’t think that the relationship between the two defense chiefs will undermine the overall security arrangements between the two countries.
TCB: What are some of the most important issues that you think they discussed during their meeting?
KM: I don’t want to speculate because I was not there. But if I were the Defense Minister of Japan, I would raise the issue of the South China Sea and the issue of protecting sea lanes between East Asia and the Middle East – especially the Gulf area. That is our economic lifeline, and we don’t want anybody to politically influence these vital sea lanes. And of course, we have a lot to discuss concerning the security of the South China Sea.
TCB: From a Japanese perspective, what does public opinion concerning both relations with the U.S. and the conduct of the Abe government look like right now?
KM: I think it’s fairly moderate. Unlike some places in Europe, especially the United Kingdom, there is not too much criticism of the new U.S. Administration in Tokyo. Fortunately, we are not Mexicans. Fortunately, we are not Muslims. Fortunately, we are not U.S. citizens.
As I said, Mr. Trump already seems to be in governing mode when it comes to Japan-U.S. relations, and hopefully, in terms of U.S. Asia policy as a whole. So we have much less critical views of the new U.S. administration as compared to more affected nations like Mexico.
