SUBSCRIBER+EXCLUSIVE EXPERT PERSPECTIVE / OPINION — The Russian Intelligence Services are getting a lot of attention in the U.S. media these days. It makes sense. After all, the Russians are waging a war of aggression against their neighbors in Ukraine, they continue to occupy parts of Georgia and Moldova and of course, they remain focused on trying to undermine the United States and its allies.
Central to all these efforts are Russian Intelligence operations. And while the Russian economy, which was healthy before February 2022, continues to suffer from Putin’s war against his Western neighbor, (and even as events in Ukraine have once again exposed the serious shortcomings in Russia’s Armed Forces) recent indications are that the Russian Intelligence Services, which suffered their own setbacks early in the Ukraine war, are once again mounting offensive operations worldwide.
Those Americans who either want to focus all the nation’s attention on China or continue to view the world as being willing to comply with Washington’s desired situation without putting up a fight or resisting U.S. influence and actions, need to be aware of the dangers of ignoring the threat posed by Russia’s Intelligence Services to U.S. National Security interests. And those tasked with identifying and countering threats posed by these Services to the U.S. and its allies need to be very familiar with the history and traditions of the Russian Services.
Spy vs. Spy
During my three-plus decade career working for the United States Government (USG), a great deal of my time was spent on Russia. I spent extensive time living and working in Russia and had professional and personal interactions with a wide range of Russian citizens, including representatives of Russia’s “Power Structures” (the Intelligence and Security Services, Law Enforcement and Armed Forces), politicians, diplomats, and members of Russia’s business community.
Realistically, it is likely that many of the Russians I interacted with outside of the Russian Intelligence Services were, in fact, Russian Intelligence officers or agents of the Services, who were working in various “cover positions”. I spent a good deal of time under the very watchful eye of those very Intelligence Services. Here are a few “lessons” I learned about the Russian Intelligence Services.
Like all Intelligence professionals, Russians make mistakes. But I learned early in my career that they are very adept at learning from their mistakes and correcting them. In the intelligence business, it was not impossible to find a “gap” or “weak spot” in Russian “defenses”. But once we found a “gap” and exploited it, the Russians quickly learned and closed the gap. In my experience, we were rarely able to re-use the same “tricks” or “ploys” against the Russians given their ability to learn from their mistakes.
Historically, the Russians have made serious mistakes and have suffered from significant Intelligence failures. For example, during the 1930s, the Soviet Military Intelligence network in Europe was plagued by a series of operational compromises that led to the arrest of both Soviet Intelligence officers and their agents inflicting damage to the Soviet Intelligence network in Europe. Moscow quickly took steps to recover from those mistakes.
Soviet Dictator Josef Stalin ordered the legendary Soviet Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU) officer Artur Artuzov to assist Soviet Military Intelligence in steps to improve its tradecraft and performance and reorganize the Military Service. By the early 1940s, Soviet Military Intelligence was running agents who provided the Soviet leadership with highly valuable intelligence that had a direct impact on Moscow’s handling of the Second World War, known in Russia as the “Great Patriotic War”.
In 2010, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) suffered a serious setback when the United States Government arrested 10 SVR illegals who had been serving under “deep cover” in the U.S. The setback did not stop the SVR and other Russian Services from training and deploying illegal operatives to the U.S. publicly evident almost 10 years later, when the U.S. Government charged a Russian who they said was living and studying in Washington D.C. as a Brazilian student.
The list of Russian Intelligence failures and recoveries at both the strategic and tactical level is long, but so is the record of their recovering from flaps and compromises while aggressively continuing to pursue operations. The Russians are much less worried about failure than their American counterparts, who in recent years have become extremely risk averse.
No one should be surprised that the Russians have reconstituted their Intelligence networks after setbacks suffered between 2018 and 2022 from the mass expulsion of Russian Intelligence officers from Western nations and the identification and arrest of Russian agents.
Russia’s Ability to Regroup
The Ukrainian Intelligence Services deserve praise for their effective use of active measures and propaganda against Moscow in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but unfortunately it appears that the Russians have regrouped, learned important lessons and are themselves now once again on the Active Measures offensive in Ukraine, across Europe and in the U.S.
The U.S. response to Russia’s extensive active measures efforts against our own country and our allies is limited and generally defensive in nature, allowing the Kremlin to pick and choose where to attack while forcing Washington to react.
One lesson I learned about dealing with the Russians is that when you identify a weakness in their defenses, it is critical that you exploit it immediately. You must be decisive and be willing to take risks while you have the opportunity. If you do not, the Russians will shore up their defenses.
There are limited opportunities to conduct effective operations and, as the saying goes, “he who hesitates is lost”.
This lesson was learned in Ukraine in 2023, after the U.S. and its allies failed to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the weapons and assistance they needed to fully exploit problems identified in the Russian military’s performance in Ukraine and resulted in the Russians not only being able to stop Kyiv’s 2023 counteroffensive, but sadly, regain the initiative against Kyiv by early 2024.
Poverty Teaches, while Wealth Spoils
Americans often ask me how Moscow can effectively conduct operations when the Russia’s economy remains underdeveloped and is suffering under the weight of sanctions and isolation from much of the world economy. These Americans should remember that ‘suffering’ and ‘deprivation’ are not uncommon for the Russians, nor is their ability to continue to conduct effective operations despite economic hardships.
During the Cold War, U.S. Intelligence experts were stunned when they discovered a listening device that had been built into the “Great Seal” of the U.S. and placed in a room used by the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR. The Americans were specifically surprised to see the Soviets’ use of cutting-edge technology to develop this clandestine intelligence collection device, which was known as Operation “Zlatoust” within the Soviet-era “People’s Kommisariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).
The CIA and NSA were again caught off guard in the 1980s, when they finally learned of another highly technical proficient signals intelligence operation mounted by the Committee for State Security (KGB), which again successfully targeted sensitive discussions and activities of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
Although the Russians have been unable to develop and mass produce anything akin to the iPhone or personal computers, in 2016, the U.S. Intelligence Community learned that the Russian Intelligence Services had been extremely effective at weaponizing the internet and using computer technology to conduct multiple cyber-attacks against U.S. and Western targets. Underestimating the Russian’s technological capabilities in the world of Intelligence and Counterintelligence operations has proven to be a critical mistake.
Russian ingenuity is not only limited to the world of technological espionage. It would be naïve to think that the Kremlin has allowed the large-scale expulsion of is diplomats and Intelligence Officers and the shuttering of its diplomatic facilities abroad to stop it from continuing to run worldwide operations.
During the early years of the Soviet Union, Moscow’s lack of diplomatic relations with most countries denied the Soviets the ability to place their Intelligence officers overseas under the cover of diplomats and defense attaches. To address this weakness, the Soviet Intelligence Services developed an extensive network of “illegal espionage networks” across Europe, Asia and the United States. Moscow skillfully exploited the sympathies and support it enjoyed among foreign communists to recruit, train, and deploy Intelligence officers who had no affiliation or ties to the Soviet Unions.
By the 1940s, the Soviet Intelligence network was supplying the Kremlin with highly valuable intelligence. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, despite the chaos and economic problems facing the newly established Russian Federation and its Intelligence Services, the Russians continued to run several high-level penetrations of the U.S. Intelligence Community. They were able to steal advanced technology from the U.S. and other countries, aggressively monitor U.S. activities in Russia from inside and outside of the country and even exploit the chaos in Russia to their own advantage.
The Russians are also highly adept at running offensive counterintelligence operations, often on a large scale and for extended periods of time. As one well known Russian saying goes, “The only free cheese is in a mouse trap”.
In the 1920s, in response to threats from the White Émigré movement and European Intelligence Services, the Soviet leadership tasked the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU) with developing a plan to neutralize anti-Bolshevik organizations like the France-based “All-Russian Military Union”(ROVs) and “Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists” (OUN).
In response, the service planned and executed a series of complex offensive CI operations like “Case 39” and the “Trest”, aka the “Trust”. Building upon the experience of Tsarist-era Intelligence traditions, the OGPU’s Counterintelligence Department (KRO) created false “opposition” organizations under the full control of the OGPU and ‘dangled’ controlled members of these organizations to Moscow’s enemies. ‘Dangled sources’ presented themselves to their targets as being sympathetic to anti-Soviet causes and passed messages to the targets that they wanted to hear.
The OGPU took extraordinary steps to build the bona fides of their controlled agents and took significant risks to accomplish their objectives, including passing disinformation to Moscow’s enemies for messaging and denial and deception purposes, identifying and compromising real members of ROVS and OUN who were active inside the Soviet Union and arresting or ‘doubling’ these individuals against the OGPU’s targets, luring members of target organizations into the Soviet Union for capture, and humiliating and discrediting the target organizations.
During the Second World War, the Soviets built upon the success of their earlier offensive CI operations to conduct another large scale, complex offensive CI operation against the Germans, known as operation “Monystr”. This operation, which was conducted under the direct supervision of Soviet leader Josef Stalin, allowed the Soviets to manipulate the German Intelligence Services in a highly effective manner.
The Soviets once again used the operation to conduct strategic and tactical level denial and deception operations, manipulated Berlin into wasting valuable resources to support fictious groups of German troops, penetrate German Intelligence training centers to identify threats to the Soviet Union and lure and capture German agents and personnel. Of note, Soviet leadership was so committed to ensuring the success of “Monystr” that it was willing to let agents under its control pass the Germans legitimate information on Soviet troop movements that resulted in the deaths of thousands of Soviet personnel but helped convince the German handlers that their agents were reliable and could be trusted.
The Soviet Union was willing to kill thousands of its own troops to ensure the success of its intelligence operation.
In the 1980s, the Committee for State Security’s (KGB) Second Chief Directorate’s (CI) GTPROLOGUE operation is yet another example of the Russians ability to plan and execute offensive CI operations.
In this operation, the Soviets effectively deceived and disoriented the CIA by running GTPROLOGUE as a dangle in an effort to protect legitimate Soviet penetrations of the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). While there is little doubt that the KGB officers who designed this operation, and today’s Federal Security Service (FSB) officers studied the lessons of the “Trest” and “Monystr” as young officers, too many of today’s American Intelligence officers are not asked to study the lessons of these operations. As a result, we repeat the same mistakes. As George Santayana said, “Those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them.”
While it was the Chinese philosopher and strategist Sun Tzu who said “Attack is the secret of defense; defense is the planning of an attack”, there is little doubt that the Russians are familiar with this philosophy, which is also reflected in the Russian proverb “The best defense is to attack”. This has been part of the Russian Intelligence Services approach to conducting their Intelligence War against Moscow’s enemies since the mid-2000s. In fact, it can be traced back to the Bolshevik Revolution, when the creators of the Kremlin’s Intelligence apparatus actively worked to export revolution to Europe and the U.S.
In 2016, many Americans were shocked when they learned of the scale of Russian interference and active measures operations targeting U.S. elections. And many in the West who refused to believe that Putin was preparing to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, were shocked when he gave the order to invade in February 2022.
In both instances, the leadership in Moscow believed it was responding to active threats against its own power and was justified in its actions given Russia’s history of being invaded. Men like Putin viewed the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union as U.S. efforts to destroy Russia and exploit its resources.
During the first and second Gulf Wars, Moscow interpreted U.S. actions as being directed toward Russia vice Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The Arab Spring in the Middle East and the Colored revolutions in the former Soviet Union were all seen as stepping stones to an eventual direct assault on Russia. And, while some among Putin’s cohorts may have initially supported the U.S. war in Afghanistan, they quickly decided that Washington’s real goal in that country was not to destroy Al-Qa’ida or bring stability to Afghanistan, but instead to surround Russia with military bases and extend U.S. influence into Southern Russia via Central Asia.
Most of the Russian Intelligence officials I interacted with in my career could not forget that during the Russian Civil War in the early 1920s, the Wilson Administration actively attempted to undermine the Bolshevik regime and went as far as deploying U.S. troops to Soviet territory.
On a social-technological front, the Kremlin clearly feared the spread of U.S. influence and western democracy and culture among the Russian population via the internet and social media, resulting in Putin ordering his Intelligence Services to go on the offensive in cyber space.
Russia’s Use of Direct Force in Ukraine
After years of trying to undermine Kyiv’s move toward the West by using active measures and subversion, the Kremlin resorted to direct force in 2014, and again in 2022, clearly understanding that if its southern neighbor was successful in developing as a stable, market-based, rule of law government, it would pose a serious threat to Putin’s ability to maintain complete control over the Russian people and their natural resources. As many experts have opined, if Putin is successful in winning the war in Ukraine, he will likely never feel safe from the threat of outside intervention and, thus, will almost certainly continue to look to expand the buffer between Moscow and the outside world – via both aggressive Intelligence operations and if necessary, the use of military force.
While the Russian Intelligence Services have clearly demonstrated the ability to run long term, highly sophisticated and nuanced Intelligence operations in the past, they have also shown Moscow’s willingness to use “brute force” to accomplish their aims when necessary. While their Western competitors are often highly sensitive to having their operations exposed and concerned about the potential diplomatic ramifications if they are caught conducting operations, the Russians have proven repeatedly that they will, at times, stop at nothing when pursuing an objective.
In the 1930s, when Stalin issued orders to have Leon Trotsky eliminated, his Intelligence Services pursued various operations to find, fix and finish Trotsky as part of operation “Utka” an initial failed attempt to kill Trotsky. The exposure of Moscow’s hand did not stop the Soviets from striking again soon after, this time successfully eliminating their target.
Later assassination operations, including the 2006 murder of former FSB Colonel Aleksandr Litvinenko in London and the 2018 attempted assassination of former GRU officer Sergey Skripal in Salisbury, England demonstrated that Putin was more interested in accomplishing his objectives than worried about being caught.
Those Russian Intelligence officers and their surrogates tasked with executing Putin’s orders likely remember Stalin’s claim that “it is safer for a Soviet soldier to attack than retreat” and understand that in most cases, turning back from an operation before it is executed can be more dangerous for them than being caught.
Of note, soon after the diplomatic fallout that resulted from the attempted assassination of Skripal in the United Kingdom, one Senior Russian Intelligence official commented to me that, while it was a shame that the operation had created diplomatic tensions between his country and the U.S., it was likely that there would be even more tensions in the future because, as he put it, “there are a lot of traitors out there that need to be dealt with.”
In my dealings with the Russian Intelligence Services, one advantage I identified that they have over their American counterparts is their knowledge of history. While American Intelligence officers and diplomats were “generalists” who rotate from region to region or subject to subject without ever really developing a deep understanding of their targets and generally not having the opportunity to build real subject matter expertise or linguistic and cultural acumen often essential in the conduct of espionage and counter-espionage operations, Russian Intelligence officers spend years focused on a particular region, country, topic, or target set. For example, during one of my overseas tours I worked against Russian Intelligence officers who had already served three to four tours in the country where I was working and had developed near native fluency in the local language.
Throughout my career, the Russian counterintelligence officers who were responsible for working against the U.S. in Russia were the same officers who had been working against them for over 25 years, giving them a great deal of knowledge and institutional memory about U.S. officers and operations.
Russian culture in general, promotes the accomplishments of the Russian Intelligence Services and it is not surprising that Putin himself was a KGB officer. Young Russian Intelligence officers are taught about the history of their Services. They also spend a good deal of effort studying the histories, cultures, and languages of the countries in which they are assigned to operate. While the budgets of the Russian Intelligence Services cannot match those of the U.S. and “stove piping”, paranoia and Russia’s “police state” mentality are all disadvantages faced by the Russians, their focus on history and languages can be seen as an advantage. Of course, this focus on history also means that the Russians have a long memory and often refer to slights or offenses made against them in the past by the U.S. or other countries. They are driven by a desire to exact revenge for those slights. During many of my discussions with Russian Intelligence interlocutors they would justify actions they were taking against the U.S. by referring to the U.S. decision during the Russian Civil War to deploy troops to Soviet territory or even “slights” made by the U.S. to Tsarist-era Russia.
The Russians also place a great deal of emphasis on the concept of reciprocity. When Moscow learns of a recruitment approach to a Russian official in a particular country, the FSB is tasked with responding in kind by approaching an official from the country in question. When another country declares a Russian diplomat “Persona Non-Grata” (PNG), The Russians respond in kind by declaring an official from the country in question “Persona Non-Grata”. If a Russian official is denied a visa by another country, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will deny a visa to an official from the country in question. If a Russian diplomat in country “X” is stopped for a traffic violation by the local police in country “X”, a diplomat of an equivalent profile and rank will be stopped soon after by the Russian traffic police as part of a reciprocal response. Of course, the Kremlin pays very close attention to any real or perceived slights made to Russia’s image and will look to respond in kind. This point is especially important for American officials to understand when they boast of actions taken by the U.S. that result in the alleged death of Russian Generals in Ukraine or harm to Russian interests.
The concept of “respect” is very important to the Russians I dealt with. Especially when they are dealing with Americans. The Russians understand that the U.S. is a “superpower” based on it’s economic and military might. And while many Russians have very positive views about U.S. culture and Americans in general, they crave being seen as equals by the Americans. They believe that to earn respect, someone must be tough, strong, and even aggressive in standing up for what they believe in or want. They will often try to establish intellectual or emotional dominance over an interlocutor.
The Great Russian General and Strategist Aleksandr Suvorov was known to say that “he who is afraid is half defeated” and the Russian Intelligence Services and their political leadership will often attempt to intimidate and instill fear in their interlocutors. This is why Putin has been known to bring large, aggressive looking dogs to meetings with foreign leaders. This is why many foreign officials working in Russia are placed under obvious and often aggressive, physical surveillance and subjected to frequent traffic stops and petty harassment.
As many of my colleagues in CIA who have dealt with the Russians know, when greeting an American they will often use an “iron handshake” that is designed to assert dominance and cause some discomfort for their interlocutor. Tapping into their deep institutional knowledge, they also attempt to intimidate by dropping hints about their interlocutors’ biographies, families and personal activities.
Given the nature of Russia’s political system and the fact that Putin can be seen as a dictator who ultimately decides all issues for other parts of the government, in the intelligence business the Russians benefit from enjoying a “Whole of Government Approach” to National Security issues.
While there are rivalries and infighting among the Russian Services and their leaders, to date, Putin has been able to create and maintain a unity of command within the Russian State structures and each ministry and organization within the State, and almost all outside of the State, are subordinate to the Kremlin and the President. Thus, they understand that when they are tasked to execute an order or decree, they must comply.
Government Ministries provide cover for Russian operatives, support services to various missions and Russia’s propaganda efforts are well coordinated and supported across State media and Intelligence structures.
Of course, it is also critical to remember that the Church is also subordinate to the State and as history has shown, is actively used by the Russian Intelligence Services to provide cover for Intelligence Officers, spot and assess targets for recruitment, project the Kremlin’s influence and monitor and report on Russian citizens.
Moscow’s Mind Games
As noted above, Russian Intelligence Officers often try to “get into the heads” of their targets and can be very effective at playing “operational games” used to confuse and disorient their opponents.
When Soviet KGB officer Vitaliy Yurchenko defected to the U.S., then re-defected back to the Soviet Union in the 1980s, KGB leadership understood that the CIA believed if Yurchenko had been a legitimate defector and was returned to the USSR, he would be punished by the KGB. He should have been arrested. Instead, the KGB gave the CIA the appearance that Yurchenko was welcome back in Moscow and was not detained or punished, creating the impression that Yurchenko had been under KGB control all along and forcing the CIA to question the value and accuracy of information he had shared when he first defected.
During the same period, when the KGB understood that CIA was becoming aware of the loss of its most valuable agents inside of the USSR and started investigating, the Soviet Service leaked information to their American counterparts that led Washington to believe that its secure communications systems had been compromised. It caused the CIA to waste valuable time chasing false leads that protected Moscow’s own penetrations of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
The KGB and its current successor organizations in Russia use the publication of “memories” of their former officers to seed disinformation about certain cases or operations to protect these or other operations and agents and confuse their opponents. A book written by a former KGB CI officer about his career for example, will provide a long description about how the service identified a CIA agent who was eventually arrested by the KGB for espionage. But the description is a false account of how the KGB identified the spy, woven into other legitimate aspects of the story.
Laboratory ‘X’: Russia’s Legacy of Lethal Operations
Stalin, who was responsible for the murder of millions of Soviet citizens, was known to use the phrase “No Man, No Problem”. Beyond killing his people at home, Stalin used the Soviet Intelligence Services to hunt down and assassinate “enemies of the State” abroad. As noted above, Trotsky was assassinated in Mexico City as part of operation “Utka”. The same Soviet Intelligence Officer who masterminded Trotsky’s removal, Pavel Sudoplatov, was also behind the 1938 assassination of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) leader Colonel Yevhen Konovalets in Rotterdam.
One of Konovalet’s successors, Ukrainian Nationalist leader Stepan Bandera was assassinated in Munich in 1959 by KGB agent Bohdan Stashynsky. In November 2006, former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer, and as mentioned, Aleksandr Litvinenko was poised by two Russian Intelligence operatives in London using polonium-210.
Former Russian Military pilot Maksim Kuzminov was killed in Spain in February 2024, likely by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). The list of targets killed by the Soviet and Russian Intelligence Services is long and the lesson is clear – the Russians will use lethal means to remove their enemies and the Russian Intelligence Services have a great deal of experience conducting assassination operations.
Long before Stalin, Vladimir Lenin ordered the creation of a ‘Special Cabinet’ in 1921, tasked with studying poisons that could be used to kill enemies of the Soviet regime. In the 1930s, the cabinet was subordinated to the OGPU and referred to as ‘Laboratory X’.
Before and after the Second World war, poisons developed by this special unit within the Soviet Intelligence Service were used to assassinate numerous enemies of the Kremlin and its allies. This method of targeting by the KGB was also used against Soviet writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Russian opposition figure Aleksey Navalny and Sergey Skripal, among others.
The West’s Loss is Russia’s Gain
Another big lesson I took away from my career and a close study of Soviet and Russian Intelligence activities since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, is that the Russians are often only as good as their opponents are not good.
Much of Moscow’s success on the Intelligence front is more a matter of poor performance or lack of attention by the security services and politicians of other countries.
For example, during the 1930s and 1940s, Soviet Intelligence successfully recruited a large network of agents in the U.S. Government and enjoyed access to a great deal of sensitive information via its network.
Unfortunately, the U.S. National Security establishment at the time had yet to mature and was distracted with other issues, especially the rise of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The problem was so bad that in some cases, the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt either ignored or dismissed warnings that the Soviets had penetrated the highest levels of the U.S. Government.
During the same period, the Security establishment in the United Kingdom (UK) performed no better, allowing the Soviets to recruit and seed a network of well-placed agents into critical positions in the UK Government.
In the first 15 years of the 2000s, the U.S. Government again ignored the threat posed by the Russians to U.S. National Security interests and both Republican and Democratic Presidential Administrations were dismissive of the threat Russia posed, with Washington learning the hard way in 2016, that the Russians remained a serious adversary capable of inflicting damage to U.S. national security interests.
I would even suggest that during the latter part of the Cold War, when the U.S. focused the type of resources and attention on countering Soviet Intelligence threat to our country and our allies, the commitment paid off and by the 1980s, the U.S. Intelligence Community experienced a high point in its Soviet operations that should be studied by the Intelligence Community to extract positive lessons learned. Allowing other national security threats to distract or weaken the attention paid to the threat posed by Russia has been, and remains, a serious mistake.
It is essential that Americans who are charged with ensuring the national security of the United States understand that Washington’s decision to assist Ukraine with weapons and intelligence remember another one of Suvorov’s quotes – “if we had not driven them into hell…hell would have swallowed us.”
In the past, the U.S. has demonstrated that it is not only capable of competing with the Russian Services but can best them – when Americans show the type of commitment, discipline and courage needed to counter the threat posed by the Russian Intelligence Services.
Elected officials, law enforcement professionals and officers of the Intelligence Community must understand that if they are not ready to be as cunning, devious, creative and when necessary – ruthless - in countering Russia’s activities, the U.S. runs the risk of being swallowed by the hell that Surorov had in mind.
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