Recent deadly attacks by Yemen's Iranian-backed Houthis inside of Saudi Arabia have raised questions about just how far the U.S. should go in helping to protect the Kingdom. We spoke with former National Intelligence Manager for Iran at ODNI, Norm Roule , who travels regularly to the region for meetings with senior leaders and asked him to help us better understand the realm of possibility.
The Cipher Brief: What exactly can the United States provide to or undertake for the Saudis that the Kingdom cannot do on its own?
Roule: The Royal Saudi Air Force is experienced, well-led, and well-resourced with advanced technology, and it can draw on a deep relationship with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Riyadh also has decades of experience dealing with Yemen. Its understanding of Yemen’s political, tribal, and military landscape is as granular as one could reasonably hope. Saudi officials responsible for managing this portfolio have repeatedly sought political and diplomatic solutions with the Houthis and other Yemeni factions. The failure of these efforts reflects Houthi unwillingness to make necessary compromises more than any lack of effort on the part of the Saudis or the United Nations. It should also be remembered that the Saudis have sought Western and international engagement on this issue for years, just as they have warned repeatedly of the consequences of allowing the Houthis to acquire sophisticated ballistic missile and drone capabilities with Iranian assistance.
In terms of the ongoing conflict, Washington has reportedly responded robustly to Saudi requests for support, providing munitions, maintenance, intelligence, and other assistance needed to improve operational effectiveness, protect personnel, and minimize civilian casualties. There remain areas in which the United States and other partners can provide additional capabilities that would likely be welcomed by the Kingdom, particularly in integrated air and missile defense, early warning, intelligence collection, and replenishment of interceptor inventories. These capabilities are particularly important given the challenge of defending against coordinated missile and drone attacks, including attacks designed to overwhelm defensive systems. The United States can also assist in identifying and disrupting the networks responsible for supplying the Houthis with missile and drone components.
We must also distinguish between Saudi air superiority from the ability to locate and destroy dispersed, mobile, or concealed Houthi missile and drone capabilities. There is no public evidence that Saudi aircraft are unable to meet their current targeting requirements or that direct U.S. air operations would fundamentally change the course of the conflict. The question is whether there are specific military capabilities or operations that Washington can provide that would materially improve Saudi security beyond what Riyadh and its Yemeni partners can accomplish themselves.
A comment on the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast bomb (MOAB). Unlike the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, which is designed to destroy reinforced or deeply buried underground facilities, the MOAB is an airburst weapon that detonates just above the ground. Its principal value lies in its devastating effects against concentrated personnel and exposed targets, its potential effectiveness against certain cave and tunnel complexes, and its considerable psychological impact on enemy forces and their leadership.
One can envision circumstances in which such a weapon might be useful in Yemen, including against certain underground missile storage facilities, manufacturing locations, or concentrations of Houthi missile and drone operators. However, its effectiveness would depend on the characteristics of the target, including the depth and reinforcement of underground structures. It is unlikely to resolve the broader missile and drone threat, much of which depends on mobile launchers, dispersed equipment, and facilities that may be difficult to locate. Its employment would also require consideration of potential civilian casualties. Most importantly, its use makes sense only if suitable targets exist that cannot be addressed as effectively by Saudi or Saudi-supported Yemeni government operations, and if we judge that destroying those targets would materially alter the course of the conflict without risking broader U.S. involvement.
The Cipher Brief: How would direct U.S. involvement in Yemen affect our operations against Iran?
Roule: Iran remains, and should remain, the principal focus of our military efforts in the region. Tehran would welcome nothing more than an American decision to become embroiled in another regional conflict. Although not all military assets or munitions are interchangeable, additional commitments of aircraft, intelligence capabilities, logistical support, and senior military attention to Yemen could divert resources that might otherwise support operations against Iran. This is particularly important given the demands of maintaining the blockade, securing the Strait of Hormuz, conducting defensive operations with our Gulf partners, and potentially preparing for expanded operations against Iran itself.
We should not, however, assume that every action against the Houthis would necessarily weaken our campaign against Iran although we do need to consider the cost to broader U.S. military requirements. The Houthis remain one of Tehran’s most important instruments of regional coercion, and effective measures to reduce their ability to attack Saudi Arabia could reinforce our broader strategy against Iran. The issue is whether the military and strategic benefits of any proposed American operation against the Houthis would justify the resources involved and the risks of escalation. This requires distinguishing limited defensive assistance, which could strengthen our regional posture, from offensive operations that might require a sustained American military commitment.
Direct U.S. military involvement against the Houthis would also risk unraveling the existing U.S.-Houthi ceasefire and exposing American forces to renewed attacks, potentially setting off a chain of events that could lead to another open-ended military campaign. Our engagement with the Houthis to sustain the ceasefire may not be attractive symbolically, particularly as Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia continue. But the arrangement has preserved American military resources and operational flexibility for the confrontation with Iran. We should not abandon that advantage without compelling evidence that doing so would produce meaningful strategic gains.
The Cipher Brief: This is a tricky situation. The U.S. wants to be seen as a strong and reliable security partner, but Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia are likely to continue. How can the administration walk this line?
Roule: The Administration will need to thread this needle carefully. It has reportedly intensified its already extensive discussions with Riyadh concerning what more can be done to protect Saudi lives, airspace, critical infrastructure, and energy facilities against continued Houthi attacks. The Kingdom’s security is not simply a matter of regional symbolism or alliance credibility. Attacks against Saudi territory threaten civilian lives, economic activity, international aviation, energy infrastructure, and the Kingdom’s ambitious economic transformation. This has a national, regional, and even global impact. Saudi Arabia’s ability to defend itself against these threats is critical to American national security and economic interests.
Our support will need to become more visible, particularly as the Saudis face growing domestic and regional expectations that their security partners will respond to attacks on the Kingdom. But visibility must be accompanied by meaningful results. Additional air and missile defense capabilities, intelligence cooperation, replenishment of defensive munitions, and measures to disrupt Houthi weapons supply networks may ultimately offer greater strategic value than direct American strikes. These measures would also demonstrate that Washington takes Saudi security seriously without necessarily expanding the American military commitment.
A MOAB strike would certainly attract attention and demonstrate American willingness to employ overwhelming force. But visibility alone is not a measure of military effectiveness or strategic success. Any such operation must be judged by whether it would significantly degrade Houthi capabilities, deter further attacks, or otherwise change the course of the conflict. A dramatic strike that fails to reduce the Houthi threat could actually weaken deterrence by demonstrating the limits of American military power. Conversely, a carefully selected operation against a critical Houthi capability could reinforce deterrence if its military benefits justified the risks.
The larger objective must remain to demonstrate that the United States is a dependable security partner without allowing the Houthis, and ultimately Iran, to draw us into another costly and potentially open-ended conflict. We should do everything possible to support our Saudi partners in defending their people, territory, and critical infrastructure against Houthi attacks. But our actions must be designed to achieve meaningful military and strategic results while preserving the resources and operational flexibility needed for the confrontation with Iran. Protecting Saudi Arabia against Iranian-supported aggression should reinforce, not undermine, that effort. Iran remains our principal adversary, and bringing that confrontation to a successful conclusion must remain our primary objective.
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