BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT - NATO’s summit in Washington proved much more than a 75th-anniversary celebration; it was chock-full of news, some behind-the-scenes controversy and developments that were unprecedented, even for an alliance that has been around since 1949. Military aid and a path to NATO membership for Ukraine dominated the conversations, along with an unusual warning to China and questions about the future of the U.S.-NATO relationship.
THE CONTEXT
In a historic first, NATO called out China in its summit communiqué as “a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine.” The alliance demanded that Beijing halt the shipment of weapons components to Moscow, and blamed China for “malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation” aimed at the U.S. and Europe. The charges came with a warning of consequences for China’s “interests and reputation,” presumably a reference to sanctions. (China’s foreign ministry dismissed the remarks as “lies and smears” and accused NATO of “malicious intent.”)
Another first: after nearly two decades of vague pronouncements about NATO membership for Ukraine, the alliance offered an “irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.” That “path” includes enhanced joint training programs and a permanent NATO envoy based in Kyiv, but the statement included the caveat that membership would come “when allies agree and conditions are met.” Eastern European officials and several Cipher Brief experts, among others, said the pledge remained too vague.
As for military aid to Ukraine, NATO committed $43 billion for the year ahead and established a new command in Wiesbaden, Germany, that would take over coordination of military support for Ukraine (a move some called an effort to “Trump-proof” aid to Kyiv). The alliance also announced the long-awaited delivery of F-16 jet fighters to boost Ukrainian air defense and ground attack capabilities - expected to join the Ukrainian Air Force this summer – along with additional MiG-29 fighter jets from Poland and various air defense systems, including Patriot missile batteries.
But here, too, the alliance came under fire from some quarters for the slow pace of weapons deliveries and a generally less-than-urgent response to Ukraine’s needs.
“It's unfortunate, because this is not a status quo, steady-as-we-go security challenge,” Doug Lute, a Cipher Brief expert and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, said on the summit’s last day. “There's open, full-fledged conventional war on NATO's doorstep. And we're continuing to take, summit after summit, incremental steps.”
The U.S. was challenged publicly during the summit by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for continuing to limit the use of American weaponry against Russian territory. “We need to lift all the limitations,” Zelensky said, “if we want to save our country.” NATO’s outgoing Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, has also called for a lifting of the restrictions, and at a Thursday news conference, President Joe Biden said the U.S. was assessing the restrictions on a “day-to-day basis.” But he also added, referring to Zelensky, “If he had the ability to strike Moscow, strike the Kremlin, would that make sense? It wouldn’t.”
NATO took some steps this week that harkened back to the Cold War, announcing plans to ramp up its own defense industry and deploy long-range missiles in Germany by 2026 to counter the threat from Russia.
Hanging over the summit was the unprecedented specter of a White House desperate to show that the American president was in full command of his faculties - and concerns about what a second Trump adminsitration might mean for the alliance.
The Cipher Brief turned to several members of its expert network – from the U.S. and Europe – for assessments of the summit, and their key takeaways. They were divided: Lute called the summit lacking in resolve and clear statements about the need to win the war in Ukraine, while former NATO commander James Stavridis said the summit had showcased an alliance “willing to stand up to (Vladimir) Putin.”
"The alliance split the difference on many issues but this is in the nature of alliances as large and sprawling as NATO," said Cipher Brief expert and former acting CIA Director John McLaughlin. "In the end the US can still take considerable comfort from the fact that the Alliance is more united than at any time since the depths of the Cold War."
- NATO allies affirmed Ukraine is on an “irreversible path” to NATO membership and that individual security deals with Ukraine constitute a “bridge to NATO.” However, NATO did not say when Ukraine will be formally invited to join the alliance.
- The alliance announced the long-term provision of military equipment, training, and other security assistance, including a promise of minimum baseline funding of €40 billion, roughly $43 billion, within the next year.
- NATO also called out China for being a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine, condemning Beijing’s support of Moscow’s defense industrial base.
- Beyond Ukraine, NATO emphasized the threat of hybrid actions against Allies. The communique highlighted Russian acts of sabotage and provocation, including the “instrumentalisation of irregular migration, malicious cyber activities, electronic interference, disinformation campaigns and malign political influence, as well as economic coercion.”
THE EXPERTS
75 years on, reasons to celebrate?
Ilves: I went to the 50th (NATO anniversary). There was reason to celebrate at that time, celebrating the new members from Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It was a moment where the world was riding high and Russia was not viewed as a threat – not perhaps very wise, but nonetheless, there was a certain optimism at the time.
Now, the celebratory aspects of this 75th (anniversary) seemed kind of tasteless, because we are facing a genuine threat, a real crisis, with huge doubts about what will happen to NATO, combined with various other disturbing news. The bombing of the children's hospital (in Kyiv), right before the summit began, certainly made the hype even more tasteless. And the lack of action as well.
Stavridis (to MSNBC): There is always going to be this tendency to think that NATO is this Cold War relic. I think of NATO as a computer program. It keeps getting updated, and quite effectively. Starts out – NATO 1.0 – is the Cold War. Hmm, who won that? The West did. NATO 2.0 is an expansive NATO in the War on Terror, responding — the only time Article 5 has been invoked — to the attack on the United States. That's NATO 2.0.
Now it’s NATO 3.0, and President Biden is correct to point out the similarities to the pre-World War II era. Here you see Europe acting together, that’s takeaway number one from this summit.
A United States engaged and part of defending Europe, because in the end we defend ourselves, that’s takeaway number two.
And number three, to pull it to the tactical level for Ukraine, a statement that their membership in NATO is irreversible. That shows a NATO that's willing to stand up to Putin.
Kleine-Brockhoff: This was the "waiting for America" summit. The choreography of it was so much dominated by the needs of the United States and the needs of President Biden to show himself as the leader of the free world, as a capable manager of the alliance, as opposed to what Mr. Trump will be.
Did (the summit) fit the world that we're in? I think you can come to different answers. NATO is about incrementalism, and you've seen a lot of incremental progress on a lot of fronts. Is that enough to meet the challenge of the day? I have my doubts.
The progress on defense spending is significant. All the data shows that we're now at 2.02% of GDP on average that everybody's paying (for defense) – 23 out of 32 (NATO members) are paying 2%, up from 10 last year. The progress is really significant. Is it enough? I would have wished that there had been a more robust conversation and a more clear outcome. Given the needs that we have, especially in Europe and the lack of time that we have, I would have liked to have seen more collective peer pressure to keep ourselves accountable. It's not just the U.S. pressuring others. It's all of us looking at each other. We need to be faster. We don't have time.
There was one thing I was impressed by: The decision by the United States to station Tomahawk cruise missiles as a conventional precision missile in Germany as of 2026. This is exactly the type of bridging mechanism that we need to have a European commitment, and America helps us to get there. That's ideal alliance management. We have nothing to threaten Mr. Putin with here. We have nothing other than extended deterrence by the United States. God knows where that goes. I thought that decision was worth the summit in some ways.
NATO membership for Ukraine: The “irreversible path”
Fried: The Washington NATO summit did not achieve breakthroughs (such as the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine for its accession to the alliance). But it was a solid summit that advanced Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership, no small feat given the hot war Russia continues to wage, and NATO's military support for Ukraine.
A year ago, in the runup to the (2023) NATO Vilnius Summit, the U.S. ran from and even appeared to resent Ukraine’s push for accession. Now the U.S. appears to actually understand that European security may require Ukraine to get out of a “gray zone” of ambiguity, which experience shows Putin regards as a green light.
Lute: I think there's a big gap between what we say, the importance we assign to the war in Ukraine, and the incremental and slow means that we provide Ukraine. I mean, if it's as important as we say – and frankly, I believe it is – I would state specifically that it is NATO's objective, and the 32 allies agree, that Ukraine must win this war. And then beyond that, once the war is won, the only way to secure the peace is by way of NATO membership (for Ukraine).
If we were that explicit, then I think that much of the support that has been so incremental and slow and, and so forth, that the purpose would be clarified.
Kleine-Brockhoff: It isn't a clear commitment - irreversibility of what process, in what time, with what steps, right? There are many questions to be asked about that. But given where we were at Vilnius (in 2023), combined with the financial commitments, that's pretty good.
Military aid for Ukraine
Fried: The alliance’s previous language about supporting Ukraine “as long as it takes” was replaced by stronger language about helping Ukraine “prevail” and “defeating” Russia’s aggression. If somebody complained (rightly) about the ambiguous nature of “as long as it takes,” they should recognize the change.
Lute: We're two and a half years into this war. and I don't think that any of the steps taken this week at the Washington summit will substantially change the battlefield dynamics in Ukraine. The steps taken will help make NATO support more durable in the future, by way of the Security Assistance Command and by way of the $43 billion for funding and the office in Kiev and so forth. So those are good practical steps, but they're not going to be decisive.
On the military front, we talk a good game, that this is a historic pivot point, an inflection point, and we will live with the aftermath of the war in Ukraine for two decades. But we don't act like it. And so we applaud the fact that two and a half years into this war, some F-16s are going to make their way to Ukraine. That's great. None from the U.S., I would add, even though the U.S. has hundreds in reserve.
Kleine-Brockhoff: Is it good enough? Is it good enough to shift the fate of the war in Ukraine, which would be the most important question? The numbers as I see them represent the continuation of the status quo. But that is not enough.
Even in that Ukraine package, you get that double-headed nature of the summit. It achieved what it could achieve given the political environment, but it didn't achieve what is necessary given the threat of the time that we have. Did it meet the threat at this time? Probably not. Did it do what is possible in a 32-member NATO, with an America in election mode? If that's the threshold, it did what it could.
Strikes against Russia - and the U.S. limits
Fried: I wish the U.S. would drop its remaining caveats on Ukraine’s use of weapons to defend itself. Ukraine should be bound by the laws of war. Further restrictions on its ability to fight its just war seem excessive.
Lute: We applaud the fact that they now have long-range precision strike systems given by us, but we limit their geographic use. It's just frustrating. I still stand by a quote I've used over and over again, which is, We've given Ukraine enough not to lose, but not enough to win.
We should remove the limits and this slow bureaucratic approach to military assistance, that is frankly bleeding Ukraine. I mean, the price that's being paid here is not a price being paid by NATO. It's the price being paid by Ukraine.
Ilves: I would have been much happier with a firm commitment on the part of the NATO allies to eliminate the restrictions on retaliation. That I think would have been an effective decision on the part of NATO, releasing the various obligations that countries have. Because, as we know, in order to use the weapons that are made in other countries who need the permission of the producer, and releasing everyone from those kinds of restrictions, I think, would have would have been far more effective than just relying on the rhetoric that really has no set time or end point.
I think there is a crisis in NATO between the values that it purports to defend, and the reality on the ground in which there is, I would call it, a wimpy fear of escalation. Ever since the invasion on the 24th of February, 2022, the West and NATO in particular have been engaged in self-deterrence. To this day, we do not have a no-fly zone over Ukraine. It took ages for minimal weapons to be sent to Ukraine. To be proud of sending Patriot (batteries), which are anti-missile defensive weapons, while continuing a ban on anything but immediate cross-border attacks or on Russian positions – all of that leaves a bad impression.
And with various talking heads on Russian TV talking about how they're going to nuke this place or another, the West goes, Oh, no, oh, no, we can't do anything because they might nuke us, when in fact, a rational calculus would show that, no, they would not want to take that step because of what it would mean for all of them.
The Biden-Trump factor
(Editor’s note: The summit was shadowed by questions about President Biden’s age and political strength. French President Emmanuel Macron and newly minted British Prime Minister Keir Starmer were both asked about Biden’s viability. Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal reported that Ukraine’s “irreversible path” toward membership could be upended by a Donald Trump victory in November’s election. And Politico reported that Trump is considering a reduction in intelligence sharing with fellow NATO members.)
Stavridis (responding to Politico report): Well, maybe we ought to be worried about our European partners deciding not to share intelligence with us when they see stacks of intelligence documents in the bathrooms in Mar a Lago. Let's start with that. And secondly, it's an indicator of the larger looming tower of Donald Trump, what he could do to NATO.
It's not just the intelligence. As the commander-in-chief, he can pull our troops out of Europe. He has expansive powers about where deployments occur. Ships could stop going to the Mediterranean, submarines stop going to the Arctic. A president has great powers and elections have consequences, so the Europeans are very correct in worrying about this.
Kleine-Brockhoff: If one of the desires was to Trump-proof NATO, it's become evident that we have to also Biden-proof NATO.
If Trump-proofing means to secure NATO from future disruptions, then somehow the same is true if Mr. Biden stays on board. Because it's pretty clear that you cannot get the needed leadership from - I don't know how to put this politely - from a visibly aging man. While the conference was about Trump-proofing, it showed another need as well. The establishment NATO crowd may not be that much better off with Mr. Biden if the person we've seen there is the leader of the free world. So, we have more than one problem, we have two problems. Here in Europe, we can just observe and analyze those problems.
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