Since his election in 2013, Western audiences have been eager to pin their hopes on Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, viewing him as a moderate who will reform his country in line with international norms. Rouhani’s recent statements criticizing the Iranian security services for detentions of journalists and U.S. citizens serve as further proof to these optimistic observers that Iran will soon turn the corner. Re-engaged with the international community following implementation of the nuclear agreement, liberal forces in Iran will emerge, personal freedoms will flourish, and Tehran will become a responsible actor in the region.
In spite of breathless Western commentary, however, these reported rifts between reformists and hardliners present a false dichotomy. There is no real evidence to suggest that liberal forces are emerging domestically or, more importantly, in Iran’s foreign policy circles. Although popular domestically and abroad, Rouhani and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, hold little authority and cannot reign in the security services or make meaningful reforms; those powers lie squarely with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Khamenei has said that there will be no change in Iran’s foreign or domestic policy following the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), the agreement Iran signed in July to receive sanctions relief in exchange for constraints on its nuclear program. Why not believe him? In the months since the deal was signed, Iran has fired a medium-range ballistic missile, ramped up cyber attacks against the U.S., expanded its role in Syria, and convicted Iranian-American journalist Jason Rezian of espionage. Last month, Iran’s parliament, the Majles, voted to reaffirm the “Death to America” chant as a symbol of the Islamic Republic.
At 76 years old and reportedly in ailing health, Khamenei’s days as supreme leader are probably numbered. Many of the supporters of the JCPA have argued that his successor—who has not been appointed—is likely to be more moderate and reform-minded; the deal’s 10-year lifespan essentially gambles on a kinder, gentler future Iran. But such a shift is highly unlikely, given the field of potential successors. The most moderate among them is former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was barred from running in the 2013 presidential election by the Guardians Council and at 81 is older than Khamenei. Members of the Assembly of Experts, the body that will select the next supreme leader, will be elected in February and must also be vetted by the Guardians Council. The Council is certain to disqualify any candidates associated with the pro-democracy protests in 2009, thereby ensuring the eventual selection of a conservative supreme leader who will share Khamenei’s worldview.
Given that we will see more of the same from Iran in the decades to come, the U.S. must formulate policies designed for today’s Iran, not the Iran we would wish to see. The JCPA was an important step toward curbing Tehran’s nuclear program, but it is not a panacea for the entire Iran problem. Now that the delicate negotiations are behind us, U.S. officials should not feel constrained by the deal, which addresses one discrete issue. We still must find ways to limit Iran’s aggressive foreign policy. Offering Iran a seat at the table in Syria negotiations provides the opportunity—albeit slight—to find common ground there, but we must simultaneously impose a greater cost on Iran for waging proxy wars across the Middle East. We should continue to sanction Iran for support to terrorism and human rights violations. Additionally, we must counter moves like the missile launch with shows of force of our own. War was not the only alternative to the JCPA, but it is important to signal that we have options at our disposal should diplomacy fail. Finally, we should respond in kind to Iran’s asymmetric warfare, whether in the cyber realm or through militant proxies. None of these options would violate the JCPA.
The supreme leader has sent a clear message that he does not intend to translate the JCPA into a greater accommodation with the international community or a more permissive environment at home. Although there is little we can do about the latter, we must take a clear-eyed view with respect to the former and pursue containment, not friendship.
