OPINION — “We used to fly satellites a long time on orbit. We weren’t thinking about combat attrition. Likewise, we weren’t thinking about space operations in terms — on an everyday basis — about a thinking adversary trying to deny us…We’re not thinking that way anymore because we know there are adversaries, we know they are going to take action with all the threat arrays that are out there to try to deny us those capabilities. So therefore, I’ve got to have advanced training for operations against a thinking adversary.”
That was Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations, U.S. Space Force, speaking last Wednesday at the Center for New American Security (CNAS) on how he is preparing to fight offensively in space while at the same time stepping up defensive measures.
Listening to Saltzman reminded me of the Cold War discussions about nuclear weapons and how you deterred their use by enemies by either expanding offensive weapons or building defensive systems – or doing both.
He said one current problem is, “I have got to have advanced training for [offensive] operations against a thinking adversary.”
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Current Space Force simulators are designed to teach procedures for current space operations, not for performing tactics to be used against an enemy who is trying to stop you. “Our simulators are built for one purpose, not for a contested domain,” he said.
Space Force also operates so-called digital ranges where they train satellite operators and test performance of new hardware, in effect virtualized environments that mimic the operation of satellites in orbit, since with space, you don’t have the ability to carve out a piece of real estate for testing and training purposes.
The existing digital range assets, Saltzman said, “are more about just trying to verify for developmental tests — is a system working the way it was designed — not if an adversary imposes a problem set on that system.”
To meet the adversary problem, Space Force put in its fiscal 2023 budget, the first funds for a $340 million National Space Test and Training Complex which will be an advanced digital range.
At CNAS, Saltzman said this new complex would “use digital models of high enough fidelity that we could actually draw tactical conclusions about tactics we could use, techniques we could use that we think would be beneficial in a contested environment.”
He then explained that because you cannot hide what you are doing in space, “we can’t live fly it [the new tactics]…because of the observables and things we want to protect.”
On the defensive side, Saltzman said that the shift is to resiliency, to have a proliferation of satellites to ensure that if some are lost, systems depending on satellites will remain operable to provide missile warning, communications, precision navigation and timing.
Originally, because it was so expensive to launch satellites into orbit, Saltzman said the thought was “how to make those capabilities last maybe forever. Honestly, I mean that was the time horizon. We weren’t thinking about combat attrition.”
However now, he said, “I’m really proud of the shift we’ve made to a more resilient architecture. The Space Development Agency has fielded first tranche of what will be 23 satellites that from order-to-orbit was just over two years.” Those 23, he said, will lead to technologies that will eventually “build the assembly lines to put hundreds of satellites on orbit to do both the data transport and missile warning. That’s a big shift both in terms of process and timelines, but also in capability.”
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Saltzman also gave an illustration of “tactically responsive space,” or how quickly Space Force could respond “with a launch and on orbit capability.” He said an exercise called VICTUS NOX involved building a satellite in less than a year and storing it in the manufacturer’s El Segundo, California warehouse until an order was given that it was needed on the launch pad within 60 hours.
Last Sept. 13, the order was given and the satellite was transported 165 miles to Vandenberg Space Force Base where it was tested, fueled, integrated with the launch adapter and ready to launch within 57 hours, according to Saltzman. They then waited for the launch order. When it came, they had 24 hours to launch, but it took them 27 hours because they had a weather hold.
Once launched into low earth orbit [LEO or some 1,200 miles above earth], the exercise called for the satellite to be checked out and operational within 48 hours to carry out its space awareness mission. It met that goal.
“From a warehouse to an on-orbit capability in a week, that’s being tactically responsive…to an irresponsible behavior [in space],” Saltzman said, adding “For those who haven’t been in the launch business, I don’t think you can fully appreciate all the work that goes into that timeline – an amazing accomplishment.”
To take advantage of that exercise, Saltzman said, “now you build a unit that can do this on a repeatable basis. How do you do the training? How do you put contract vehicles in place?”
With resiliency, Saltzman explained, “You change the nature of how you do the mission from four or five satellites in GEO [geostationary orbit 22,000 miles above the earth] to 400 satellites in LEO, changing the targeting calculus and now they [adversaries] may not have the magazine depth [armaments] to go after all the satellites; we can’t shoot down all those satellites so why start that conflict.”
In short, Saltzman said, “More resiliency, more deterrence.”
In Ukraine, he said, “we’re seeing that low earth orbit constellations are resilient against attack…there’s just evidence of it, we knew that would be the case theoretically, it’s nice to kind of get combat feedback that says yep you’re on the right path.”
As a result, Saltzman said, “We are investing heavily to take our no fail missions, like missile warning, nuclear command and control, and making sure we are putting together resilient architectures that creates targeting problems that our current capabilities don’t have…We think that not only will be more resilient, but also have a deterrent effect on even trying to dismantle those missions.”
To maintain stability in space, Saltzman explained his views about deterrence.
“The question is do you have a credible enough force to impose cost such that the original [offensive] action shouldn’t be taken, at least in the mind of the opponent…That’s what I’m thinking.”
He further explained, “How do I have a combat credible force that I know can counter irresponsible behavior, hazardous behavior, or behavior that could put us at a strategic disadvantage? Do I have that ability? And if the adversary knows I have that ability, does it create a deterrent, does it constrain [the adversary’s] behavior in the [space] domain?”
Saltzman then raised the interesting question of how does the adversary get deterred if the U.S. offensive/defensive capabilities in space are all secret?
“How do you deter with something they don’t know about?” Saltzman asked rhetorically. “It’s a great question and so we are trying to find ways to make sure they know we have some capabilities. They may not know the scale, they may not know the scope, they may not know the particulars, but they see evidence and they know we have the capability to disrupt, to deny, to degrade in a way that just causes pause…And if I can just put doubt in their mind, maybe 70-30, that stops them from taking that first action. That’s the goal.”
The use of two atom bombs against Japan, followed by atmospheric and underground testing of more powerful nuclear weapons, have so far deterred their further use.
What can be done to show a deterrent effect of weapons in space?
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