At the November 2015 meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, China’s “open door” and “going out” policy, first declared in the late 1970s, was reaffirmed. Since its introduction and implementation, the policy has had a significant impact for China and the world. Today, China has become the world’s second largest global economy, and China’s presence—politically, economically, and otherwise—is evident internationally. With increased capacity and global activities, China’s rapid rise has raised the question: What are China’s intentions?
China’s intentions have been heatedly discussed and examined regarding its expanding relationship with Africa. Why Africa? China’s interaction with the United States and the European Union, the global political and economic centers, with Russia, its massive neighbor to the north, and with South and Southeast Asia, its neighbors to the South, are self explanatory. The relationships are largely determined by geopolitical, economic, historical, and global power factors. But the development de novo of a close relationship between China and Africa in modern times is another story, for varied reasons and over an extended time period. Both parties, especially China, have invested copious time and physical resources to develop and sustain the new relationship.
The People’s Republic of China was founded in October 1949; formal relations with Africa began in the late 1950s, early 1960s. By 2015, the relationship had developed into an elite “mutual admiration” partnership, with each side providing the other with a range of support—ideological, developmental, political, economic, trade, and others—to create and sustain the complex emerging relationship. For example, China was an early supporter of Africa’s liberation movements, in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and other nations; it extended political, economic, and military support to many newly independent African nations in the 1960s. It is estimated China had provided African nations with US$20.5 billion in direct public and private investments between 2005 and 2013 and with 160.5 billion Chinese yuan in foreign aid between 2000 and 2013 (in 2015 the exchange rate was US$1=6.3 yuan) to support Africa’s economic and social development. Earlier, prior to its growing capacity, China had also utilized foreign aid to achieve political and ideological goals. It is estimated that through 1971, China committed US$1.2 billion, or 55 percent of its foreign aid, to Africa. This included over US$500 million to build the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. In return, China sought and received a range of tangible and intangible “rewards” from Africa. To date, China’s “investments” have reaped a manifold of benefits.
Consider China’s early interaction with African states in the 1960s and 1970s. A primary intention was diplomatic/political, seeking the newly independent African states’ recognition of the legitimate government of China, the “One China” policy, which had been claimed by Taiwan. But the diplomatic battles fought between China and Taiwan in Africa were not limited to who constitutes China; the struggle was also related to who represented China globally, at the United Nations, other international institutions, and beyond. The question was resolved in 1971 when the United Nations, supported by African member states, voted to accept China as the legal representative. (Following the vote in favor of China in the General Assembly, the Tanzanian representative to the United Nations was reported to have danced in the aisles. Reflecting on the event years later, Dr. Salim Salim said his only regret was that he had not brought his drums to the celebration!) Clearly, political goals were the primary intentions buttressed with China’s foreign aid and other activities. Future political intentions, supported with additional largesse, will surely reinforce closer relations with Africa to realize China’s heightened global role.
In recent years, with the political representation issue settled (a “diplomatic truce” between China and Taiwan was reached not to “raid” the other’s African state), and with China’s own development and increased capacity, a focus of China Africa relations shifted to issues relating to mutual support, rationalization, and routinization. This was achieved, in part, through the founding in 2000 of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which spells out each third year China’s “grand strategy,” detailing common goals and sectors targeted for “investments,” from agriculture to infrastructure projects, from training African professionals to building rural schools in Africa, and other developmental endeavors. The ensuing added levels and value of cooperation and interdependence have produced positive and negative challenges for both parties. For China to supply and sustain its economic and social growth, and political stability, Africa has become critical in its search for resource security; China has become a major purchaser of and investor in Africa’s iron ore, copper, oil, timber, and other commodities. But dependency on China also has a direct negative impact. Lower demands for African commodities due to contracting Chinese economic growth and falling prices, current and projected, impacts directly Africa’s revenue intakes, general economy, and political stability.
A critical question is how China’s current economic rebalancing and proposed 13th five-year plan, approved at the November 2015 party meeting, impacts China-Africa relations, especially China’s investments and other activities in Africa. As President Xi Jinping is reported to have uttered to world leaders following the meeting, “China’s 13th five-year plan cannot be realized without substantial cooperation from the world.” For Africa and other recipients of Chinese largesse, will foreign aid, investments, and other economic activities continue their upward progression, stabilize or contract, and/or be reduced, downsized and postponed? Furthermore, greater selectivity of African economic sectors for continued Chinese investments may well be considered. China’s future policies could be forthcoming at the FOCAS meeting in Johannesburg next month. Put differently, what are the limits of China’s “investments?”
Whither China’s investments in Africa? As suggested, China’s intentions in Africa have been issue, situational, and time dependent; China’s global role has been advanced by its direct role in Africa. The future of China’s investments in Africa depends upon both the degree which China’s activities contribute to Africa’s primacies and how they serve China’s own developmental and political goals. In the latter instance, China’s recent announcement that it will establish a military base in Djibouti is in accordance with enhancing the capacity to assist and protect its growing body of personnel in need, economic "investments," and political "interests" in Africa.
China’s reaffirmation of the “open door” and “going out” policy will surely further advance the inter-dependency between domestic and external, political, and economic policies. In the short term, the question is the extent of the impact of the coming rebalancing of China’s economy upon Africa!
George T. Yu is Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Illinois Urbana.
