Over the past decade, the Philippines has gradually shifted from an equi-balancing strategy vis-à-vis the United States and China in favor of a more explicit tilt into the American strategic orbit. Bilateral relations with America have been rapidly blossoming, while Sino-Philippine relations have wilted.
Today, the Philippines is among the most enthusiastic supporters of the American Pivot to Asia, and has been on the forefront of an ongoing legal showdown with China at The Hague. Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the Philippines is also opening up its military bases and other related facilities to American armed forces.
Filipino officials have, similar to their American counterparts, characterized China as a “bully,” with Philippine President Benigno Aquino on two occasions, likening China to Nazi Germany. Bilateral economic relations have suffered, and there has been a virtual total collapse of institutionalized communication channels between Filipino and Chinese heads of states. Chinese President Xi Jinping is yet to hold a single formal summit with his Filipino counterpart, who is stepping down from office in about two months.
In many ways, one could argue that China and the Philippines have the most toxic bilateral relationship in Asia. It’s an astonishing observation, when one considers how not long ago, under the Arroyo administration (2001-2010), the Philippines was actually cultivating a very constructive and fruitful bilateral relationship with China, giving birth to major diplomatic breakthroughs, such as the 2005 Joint Maritime Seismic Agreement (JMSU) among the Philippines, China, and Vietnam in the South China Sea, as well as big-ticket Chinese infrastructure projects in the Philippines. The ‘golden age’ of Philippine-China relations didn’t last for long, however.
This was, by no means, the product of caprice, nor was it the reflection of a specific administration’s foreign policy doctrine. Instead, it was Beijing’s rising assertiveness in the South China Sea, and its creeping intrusion into Philippine-claimed waters that triggered a panicked response in Manila. In particular, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, which saw Chinese and Filipino vessels playing a diplomatic game of chicken over who would leave the area first, awakened the Philippines to its precarious position in the contested waters.
With China having the upper hand in the disputed area, which falls within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone, the Aquino administration embarked on a three-pronged policy response. First, Aquino accelerated the Philippines military modernization, with a clear intention of developing the Southeast Asian country’s minimum deterrence capability. A few months after the Scarborough Shoal crisis, Aquino signed the Revised AFP Modernization Act, extending it for another 15 years.
The country’s defense doctrine gradually shifted from internal security operations towards external maritime defense. In 2013, the Philippines’ defense spending increased by a whopping 17 percent, with the Aquino administration allocating US$1.73 billion for defense procurement over the next five years. But this was nothing compared to China’s massive defense spending increase and rapid military modernization in recent years.
Second, hopelessly outgunned by China, the Philippines pushed ahead with filing a potentially consequential arbitration case against its giant neighbor. It became the first country to take China to court over the South China Sea disputes. Through the arbitration case, the Philippines hopes to nullify China’s expansive claims, specifically the notorious “nine-dashed-line,” which runs across the contested areas, including Philippine waters.
The arbitration case, if successful, could provide the United States, Japan, and other major countries a perfect legal pretext to conduct and expand Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) along China’s artificially-created/illegally-occupied islands. Diplomatically, it allows the Philippines and likeminded countries to put maximum pressure on China by accusing it of being an international outlaw.
Third, the Philippines has ramped up its defense cooperation with the United States under the EDCA, which provides American forces greater rotational access to Philippine military bases and facilities in exchange for an increase in American military assistance to the host country. The Aquino administration hopes that America’s growing military footprint on its shores will also serve as a ‘latent deterrent’ against further Chinese adventurism within its claimed waters.
Under the Aquino administration, particularly in the last three years, the Philippines has also enjoyed a rapid transformation in its bilateral relations with Japan, which has emerged as the country’s second most important defense partner. Under the Shinzo Abe administration, Japan has dispatched a growing number of troops, vessels, and even submarines to the Philippines, and, under a newly-signed defense equipment transfer agreement, it is poised to export advanced military hardware to the Southeast Asian country.
None of the Philippines’ actions, so far, have had any significant impact on China’s behavior in the South China Sea. If anything, one could argue that China has even been emboldened to tighten its grip on contested waters by building a sprawling network of military/civilian facilities across the Paracel and Spratly island chains. More disturbingly, China has also deployed advanced military platforms—from surface-to-air-missile (SAM) systems and mobile artilleries to high-frequency radars and fighter jets—to the area.
With the Philippines presidential election approaching, there is also speculation that there could be some change in the country’s South China Sea strategy, particularly in how it deals with China. But a careful examination of Philippines’ domestic politics and its maritime security predicament suggests that it’s highly unlikely that the next Filipino president will introduce another twist to the country’s China policy, unless Beijing offers major concessions.
