President Donald Trump has agreed to meet with Kim Jong Un and the other players, China and North Korea, are preparing. The question is: How should Trump prepare for the meeting? Experts find a number of reasons to be skeptical about this abrupt announcement, especially the lack of lower-level preparation for a summit, the difficulty of verifying any results, and the question of giving the North Korean leader recognition without compensation.
However, there are also reasons to believe this may be a good move. In any case, we can learn from the pitfalls that plague any decision like this to understand what kind of deal we should make.
First, let’s look at the record. The highest direct official discussions by the United States with a North Korean leader occurred when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang in 2000. I was with her as State Department spokesman. Kim Jong Il, father of the current leader, hosted her.
During their discussions, he made dramatic concessions one after another at the table, sometimes appearing to be swatting away problems like flies. He promised an end to their missile programs. He promised verification. And, he promised that he would make further moves if he got a meeting with then-President Bill Clinton.
Albright welcomed his compromises, but insisted that verification and disposition of existing missiles had to be settled before she could recommend a meeting to the president. She stuck to her guns. In the end, the North Koreans didn’t agree on these measures even at subsequent lower-level negotiations. President Clinton didn’t go.
What did we learn from her visit? First, that the regime is heavily reliant on the North Korean military. The preparatory delegation, the first meeting location, the organization of events, all rested in the hands of the military. The titular head of government at one point evaded a question from Secretary Albright by saying, “I don’t know; I’m only the president.”
Today, the military and the Party Leader remain the only ones who matter, and Party Leader Kim Jong Un appears to have established firm control of the military.
Second, only the leader can go back on previous policy. All others are bound to support it through thick and thin. Foreign Ministry representatives and other envoys have helped mold deals and make incremental progress over the years, but the big decisions come only from one point.
Third, it may take several rounds to get what we want, but our side needs to be clear on exactly what we need and what we’re prepared to give. Then, we need to stick to it with discipline and firmness. At the same time, we need to freeze the sanctions in place until we make real progress.
Fourth, the sooner we get started the better. Nothing good has happened since those talks broke down and the subsequent Six-Party Talks were abandoned. Having ongoing conversations at least kept the programs capped.
And fifth, consultations with allies in Japan and South Korea as well as with China are essential to holding firm and ensuring the North Koreans know what the deal is and will remain. Any strategy to prepare for the meeting needs to include high-level consultations in advance with the other interested parties.
So, what about President Trump’s dramatic move? First, it may be the only way to get started on “denuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula – and it may be working: Kim Jong Un has said he is willing to work toward de-nuclearization, according to official Chinese media reports and to the South Koreans. Clearly, we need to hear directly that North Korean accepts this goal for the talks and hear what they understand by denuclearization. Surely, it won’t be the same as our definition but that’s what the talks are about. A high-level meeting may be the only way to get the reversal of existing programs and move towards denuclearization. It will be vital, however, that the President stick to a clear position, and not be swayed by banquets, cheerleaders or the “big man” syndrome.
Second, security guarantees will be essential to any solution that sacrifices North Korea’s nuclear and missile capability. We should find it fairly easy in terms of domestic U.S. sentiment to provide guarantees against “regime change” from the United States, since Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has spoken openly of his reluctance to start a war on the peninsula. As President Trump has been combative on Twitter, and his Secretary of State nominee Mike Pompeo has spoken openly of regime change in North Korea, it will probably take guarantees from China, Russia and Japan as well, so a restart of Six Party Talks with the goal of a peace treaty will be one necessary outcome.
Third, in return for the “face” that Kim Jong Un will get by sitting across the table from the president of the United States, the president needs something clear in return: an up-front commitment to cease testing missiles and nukes. Indeed, a permanent end to testing of missiles and nuclear weapons is an essential element of any final deal since whatever the difficulties in finding Kim’s facilities, testing makes a violation clear to the international community and thus would be a clear predicate to re-imposing international sanctions. Testing also constitutes the essential and the final step of mating a weapon to a missile, the point at which the nuclear danger to the U.S. and others becomes reality. So, no testing means no reliable, operational nuclear force, however close he is to that point now.
What about the difficulties that many cite?
Preparation: Both we and North Korea know what we want so one can say the preliminaries are concluded. We want an end to their nuclear and missile threat, and they want security guarantees for the regime. That’s a deal we should be able to make.
Verification: admittedly impossible. The numerous facilities that North Korea has developed, and the likelihood of hidden facilities make the task herculean. Yet, what should we do if a deal can’t be 100% verified? Give up? Let them continue? Pretend? In the end, a deal is better than no deal, inspections are better than an unfettered program. Get the International Atomic Energy Agency back in. But let’s not fool ourselves – the inspections will not be perfect.
Giving “face” to a dictator: Yes, but if we have no intention of “regime change” it costs us nothing if we get something in return: the “no testing” rule in advance. That way, both leaders meet with something in their pocket already.
In the end, the security of the U.S., South Korea and Japan relies on deterrence. Deterrence will work with North Korea if the Kim regime and its military understand that any conflict will end in swift and sure destruction of their rule. Thus, we cannot relax the U.S. nuclear guarantee for Japan and South Korea – something North Korea is already reported to be pushing for. We should consider steps to lower tensions on the Korean Peninsula only if they do not remove the ability of the U.S. and South Korea to repel a conventional attack and to destroy the leadership in the North.
Meeting directly with Kim is not really a high stakes gamble. If the North balks at denuclearization, we can turn to friends and partners to increase sanctions. Willingness to meet shows to a skeptical world that we are ready literally to go the extra mile and offers us a chance to end the North’s incessant momentum towards possessing a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile. A high-level start may be the only path to get the North to reverse course, but requires clear-eyed and unwavering determination. Good luck, Mr. Trump.
Ambassador Richard Boucher served 32 years at the U.S. Department of State, including roles as Ambassador to Cyprus, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia, and Spokesman for six different Secretaries of State. After retiring from the State Department, Boucher spent almost four years as Deputy Secretary-General of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
