OPINION — “Despite claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II…After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain, with manufacturing declining, slowing growth of 0.6 percent in 2025, and no globally competitive technology firms to help drive long-term productivity.”
That’s a quote from Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine, a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analysis brief by Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe, released January 27, which says that “a close look at the data suggests that Russia is hardly winning [its war against Ukraine],” and, even more interestingly, that “Russia is increasingly a declining power.”
Jones, President of CSIS’ Defense and Security Department, and McCabe, Associate Fellow in CSIS’, Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, not only assess that “Russia’s overall progress on the battlefield, especially in the last two years, fall decisively short of Moscow’s goal to militarily conquer Ukraine,” but also that “Russia’s economy is showing signs of strain, and long-term productivity looks bleak.”
Let’s start with the Jones/McCabe analysis of the military situation and below look at their view of Moscow’s economic situation.
While saying assessing casualties and fatalities in wartime is difficult and imprecise, and various sides have incentives to inflate or shrink the numbers for political purposes, Jones/McCabe write that “According to CSIS estimates, Russian forces suffered nearly 1.2 million battlefield casualties, which include killed, wounded, and missing, between February 2022 and December 2025…There were roughly 415,000 Russian casualties in 2025 alone, with an average of nearly 35,000 casualties per month. In addition, there were roughly 275,000 to 325,000 Russian battlefield fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025.”
Compared to the past, the CSIS analysis showed, “Russian battlefield fatalities in Ukraine are more than 17 times greater than Soviet fatalities in Afghanistan during the 1980s, 11 times greater than during Russia’s First and Second Chechen Wars in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively, and over five times greater than all Russian and Soviet wars combined since World War II.”
The CSIS team attributes the high Russian casualties and fatalities to such things as “Russia’s failure to effectively conduct combined arms and joint warfare, poor tactics and training, corruption, low morale, and Ukraine’s effective defense-in-depth strategy in a war that favors the defense.”
Specifically the CSIS analysis says, “Russia’s attrition strategy has accepted the costs of high casualties in hopes of eventually wearing down Ukraine’s military and society. On the battlefield, Russia has utilized dismounted infantry to wear down and attrit Ukrainian lines, along with small first-person view (FPV) drones, artillery, glide bombs, and other stand-off weapons. Russian units have routinely conducted advances using small squads of troops, often poorly trained, that are supported by armored vehicles or light mobility vehicles. Higher Russian headquarters frequently order these forces to advance toward Ukrainian positions to conduct reconnaissance by drawing fire. If Ukrainian positions are positively identified, Russian soldiers may be sent forward to attack positions, which are further mapped and then targeted with artillery, FPV drones, and glide bombs. These tactics have led to high fatalities and casualties.”
The Ukraine side is also given credit for “their defense-in-depth strategy in a war that has largely favored the defender. Ukraine has used trenches, dragon’s teeth (anti-tank obstacles), mines, and other barriers—along with artillery and drones—to attrit advancing Russian soldiers and vehicles. The eastern front line, for instance, continues to be saturated with drones. As a result, vehicle movement is difficult within 15 kilometers of the front line. Infantry soldiers must instead march to their positions for 10 to 15 kilometers.”
One result has been Russia’s slow rate of advance. According to the CSIS analysis, “Russia’s gains since it took the initiative in January 2024 are far smaller than the large territorial shifts seen earlier in the war. At the peak of the initial invasion in March 2022, Russian forces seized roughly 115,000 square kilometers in less than five weeks, but by April 2022, Ukraine had retaken more than 35,000 square kilometers. By November 2022, Ukraine had retaken approximately 75,000 square kilometers, including through successful counteroffensives around [the Ukraine cities] Kharkiv and Kherson.”
Although the Russian economy has held up better than expected following U.S. and other Western country sanctions imposed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, strain on its economy is starting to show.
The CSIS analysis says, “In 2025, Russian manufacturing declined at its fastest rate since March 2022, with contractions in output and new orders, a rising labor shortage, and a decrease in input buying. Overall, Russian manufacturing suffered seven consecutive months of contraction in 2025, with production levels declining for ten consecutive months. In addition, consumer demand weakened and inflation was high.”
Jone/McCabe write there is also a labor crunch, a drop in oil revenues with lower global prices, with 2025 economic growth slowing to 0.6 percent, while the International Monetary Fund estimates that Russia’s growth would remain slow, at 0.8 percent, in 2026.
The CSIS team also says Russia faces a capital problem. Unable to borrow on international markets, the Kremlin has borrowed at home and raised taxes to finance the Ukraine war. Roughly half its budget is spent on the armed forces, the military-industrial complex, domestic security, and debt service.
“While the war sustains jobs and industrial activity,” the CSIS team says, “it produces few lasting assets or productivity gains. Higher taxes burden the civilian economy, which is already suffering from double-digit interest rates and significant labor shortages. Tank factories are working overtime, but automobile producers have cut shifts.” Ammunition, uniforms, and fortifications contribute to current GDP, but they do not improve long-term welfare or capital formation.
According to Jones/McCabe, “Russia also faces one of the most severe demographic challenges among major economies, with a shrinking and aging population, low birth rate, high mortality rate (especially among working-age men), and high rate of emigration among skilled workers.”
One example where the CSIS analysis finds Russia falling behind is in Artificial Intelligence (AI). It points out that Russian President Vladimir Putin once predicted, “Artificial intelligence is the future not only of Russia but of all of mankind. . . . Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” But it then states, “Russia today is a bottom-tier AI power. It ranks 28 of 36 countries in the overall strength and development of its AI ecosystem—or AI ‘vibrancy’ -- according to Stanford University. The top-performing Russian AI model trails even older iterations of OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s Gemini.”
Even worse, not a single Russian company is among the top 100 technology companies in the world by market capitalization, while the U.S. leads the pack.
As for the space race, where Russia was once a leader, Roscosmos, the state corporation in charge of the Russian space program, carried out only 17 orbital launches in 2025, according to the CSIS analysis. That compares to 193 U.S. orbital launches and 92 by China. Russia’s space industry also suffered an accident in December 2025 that caused severe damage to the launch pad Russia uses for sending astronauts and cargo to the International Space Station. In addition, a 2018 Soyuz rocket carrying two astronauts failed as it headed to space; the emergency abort system carried the two to safety.
There has also been a decline inside Russia in popular support inside Russia for the war. According to polls cited by CSIS, in May 2023, 57 percent of Russians believed that most people in their inner social circle supported the war, compared to 39 percent who opposed the war. By October 2025, 55 percent of Russians in their inner social circle opposed the war, compared to 45 who supported the war.
All thi, however, has not appeared to have affected Putin, who, according to the Jones.McCabe analysis “remains undeterred by the high casualty and fatality rates, and Russia’s economic downturn is unlikely to bring the Kremlin to the negotiating table—at least on terms that would be acceptable to Ukraine or Europe.” They say, “Putin may be willing to accept the high casualty and fatality numbers because most of these soldiers are from such regions as the Far East and North Caucasus—and not politically vital areas for him, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg.”
In addition, the Jones/McCabe analysis finds, “President Putin and the Russian government have been adept in conducting an aggressive disinformation campaign that has convinced some policymakers, including in Washington, that Russian victory is inevitable, despite substantial evidence to the contrary.”
The CSIS team attributes that to Russia having “boosted its funding for state-run media in 2026 by roughly 54 percent, indicating a commitment to intensified information warfare. The Kremlin’s propaganda machine is designed to sustain domestic support for the regime and its war against Ukraine, as well as to convince key foreign audiences that the war has been successful and needs to continue.”
