My friends and family often ask me why Russia behaves so offensively. They are baffled by Russia’s lack of humanity and Moscow’s actions such as hiring assassins, launching drones at innocents, and planning economic sabotage against international companies. While not an excuse, just an explanation, scholars of Russia understand the country’s deep sense of insecurity and vulnerability. Its longing to be a part of Europe, and its own view that its rightful place as a global leader are all driving Russia’s barbaric actions. According to strategic culture theorists, a state’s approach to war is shaped by its cultural and historical experiences, including geography, religion, language, and national identity. These factors influence a state’s perception of security threats, willingness to use military force, and approach to diplomacy and negotiation. They also help us to anticipate a state’s actions.
Russian strategic culture reflects a worldview shaped by centuries of conflict, invasion, brutality against others, inflicted on its people from foreign powers and by the government against its own population, and foiled attempts to become card carrying members of the west. Key elements of Russian strategic culture include the belief that the rest of the world, especially the West consistently undermines Russia and thwarts it rightful place as a world leader, and a belief in the necessity of military strength to push back the West. When the West does not push back, Moscow believes that their tactics are working.
Insecurity Drives Every Move
Russia’s persistent awareness of vulnerability and deep-seated mistrust of its neighbors is deeply ingrained and a consequence of centuries of historical experience. This insecurity manifests as a deep-seated suspicion of the West and a zealous determination to maintain control over Russia’s perceived sphere of influence. Understanding the historical currents that have shaped this perception is crucial for comprehending Russia’s present-day actions.
Russia’s experiences with wars and conflicts, such as the Mongol invasion, Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II, have reinforced the idea that the country is constantly under threat and must be prepared to defend itself at all times. The Russian feeling of vulnerability and insecurity, particularly concerning interactions with “Western countries” is ingrained. To counter this insecurity Russian leaders have long highlighted the importance of having buffer zones on its borders. Removing those buffer zones heightens Russia’s sense of vulnerability.
From as early as the 18th century, Russian imperial strategy was heavily influenced by the need to create and maintain buffer zones along its western borders. Peter the Great and Catherine the Great both conquered lands on Russia’s borders so that Moscow would have a buffer from invasion. This proactive doctrine was aimed at insulating the Russian heartland from European powers. The annexation of Baltic territories, the absorption of Finland, and the partitioning of Poland were all manifestations of this strategy. These territorial acquisitions were driven by a pragmatic logic: to push potential adversaries further away and create a strategic depth that would absorb any initial blows in case of conflict. Russia continues to try to use buffer states or “allies” to keep others from its immediate vicinity, but this is an increasingly difficult task for Moscow as its former republics and satellite countries choose new alliances and partners.
Germany’s invasion of Russia in 1941 was a defining moment in Russia’s historical experience. This invasion resulted in some 27 million Soviet deaths and widespread devastation. It cemented Russia’s profound sense of betrayal from the West, and a visceral need for absolute security. World War II profoundly shaped Russia’s post-war security calculus, leading to a pursuit of military strength and a zero-tolerance policy for any perceived threat on its borders. The narrative of this war is deeply embedded in Russian society, serving as a constant reminder of the price of vulnerability and the imperative of never allowing such an event to recur. Putin’s family was directly affected by WW2 with his brother dying of starvation during the siege of Leningrad, his Grandmother killed by the Germans in Tver, and his father being severely injured during combat duties. He often discusses this in his speeches.
The post-Soviet era where East European nations and former Soviet Republics are joining NATO and the EU is particularly distressing for Moscow. The historically more neutral northern European countries joining NATO also is alarming to Moscow. From Moscow’s perspective, the loss of Ukraine to the West represents not just a geopolitical setback, but the obliteration of a crucial defensive buffer. We are also seeing Moscow’s anxiety rising regarding Armenia’s recent moves toward the West.
During the first summer of the Ukrainian war, Putin compared himself to Peter the Great and likened the invasion of Ukraine to the eighteenth century Russian Czar’s wars. This underscores the mindset of Russian leaders and shows that their history is never far from them.
Earning for Inclusion
Russia’s geographic position has greatly impacted its strategic culture. Russia is the biggest country in the world, and while only 23 percent of the country is in Europe, almost 80 percent of the population lives there. This makes Europe extremely important for Russia. One can see this link throughout Russian history. Even from the founding of the modern Russian state in the sixteenth century, its foreign interests were linked to Europe. When Peter the Great established an empire, the interconnections with Europe increased. Russia conducted wars and created alliances with different European countries. Russian nobles were stung when European nobles mocked them and called them uncouth and barbaric.
Today, the Kremlin emphasizes narratives that underscore Western hostility, and Russia’s role as a decisive power in European affairs. These narratives reinforce Russia’s claims to special rights in regional security and justify to itself and its people, assertive foreign policy actions, including military interventions in neighboring states. Any expansion of western power such as expansion of NATO and deployment of U.S. forces in Europe are perceived as existential threats to the Russian state and infringing on Russia’s rightful relationship with Europe, just as they were during the Soviet-era.
Demanding a Seat at the Table
For centuries, leaders of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union emphasized Russia as a great power. During the Cold War, Russia, through the Soviet Union, was able to act as a global leader. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders were confronted with the fact that Russia had limited “spheres” of influence.
A main aim of Russian foreign policy under Putin is regaining and maintaining great power status. Putin repeats in his speeches that Russia is a great power and that the West, especially the United States, does not give Russia the respect it deserves. The Russian people support this view. Moscow remains angered that in its view, after the Cold War, the United States created a unipolar world and used NATO to maintain its hegemonic status. Putin has consistently publicly lamented the breakup of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” More recently, Putin has said, “At last, Russia has returned to the world arena as a strong state - a country that others heed and that can stand up for itself.”
Russian leaders view Russia’s military might, both kinetic and grey zone activities, as their way to press for global leader status. They believe that Russia must take what it believes is its due such as Ukraine. Russian leaders also contend that it must make the West uncomfortable with continued attacks such as the drone incursions, assassinations, and ongoing disinformation. Pressing this avenue, in their view, wil make the West eventually give up on pushing back on Russia and allow Russia to take its rightful place as a global leader.
Implications for Policy and Security
None of this explanation of Russia’s national security mindset is meant to apologize for Russia’s barbaric behaviors. It is meant to help negotiators and policy maker understand Russia’s perspective, however misinformed and self-determined. Russian strategic culture emphasizes an assertive approach to conflict which is meant to make up for Russian feelings of vulnerability and being outcast from the West. This approach is evident in Russia’s actions in Ukraine, where strategic culture drives Russia’s actions.
Moscow’s lack of trust in the West is underscored by Putin and his circle who are the representatives of the “greatest generation” of the Soviet Union. These leaders grew when the state was a global power and controlled parts of Europe. They came to the pinnacle of their careers when the West, having forced the breakup of the Soviet Union, attempted to replace Soviet and Russian culture with Western values. They are bitter about this.
Having a realistic view of Russia’s perceived right and left limits allows negotiators and military planners to develop a workable way ahead in foreign relations. It should not limit US actions in calling out Russia’s morally and ethically abhorrent actions but it should inform our actions.
In summary, Russian strategic culture is driven by a sense of vulnerability, a focus on wanting to be part of the cool club of European nations, and an outsized view that Russia should be a global leader, regardless of its barbaric actions.
Russian and Ukrainian Clashing Strategic Cultures
Russia and Ukraine both see a negative outcome of the current war as an existential threat to their existence. That means that negotiating a settlement is difficult, herculean, and likely under the current circumstances an impossible task. Diplomacy alone cannot produce a durable settlement, because the two strategic cultures are incompatible. At most, military exhaustion could produce an armistice that freezes the conflict without resolving it. Before Russia’s insecurity can be addressed, the rest of the world must make it clear that Russia will maintain pariah status if it continues its slaughter of Ukrainian citizens and attacks in the west. The third-party sanctions recently passed by Congress are a step in the right direction. Sanctions alone, however, will not stop Russia whose people are used to hardship and even expect it. I am usually an optimist but for now, unfortunately, I cannot see a positive way forward in this war. The themes that Ukraine and Russia have woven through their strategic cultures indicate that there will be more deaths, destruction, and hardship before this war ends. The best that the world can do is to contain the violence and help Ukraine continue to strengthen its statehood while calling out each and every Russian atrocity.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
