For the first time in years, large swaths of Yemeni territory are changing hands. The Houthis’ recent losses in the east of the country were quickly followed by a string of victories along the Red Sea coast that brought the group closer to the Bab al-Mandeb strait. Early readings that the eastern losses marked the beginning of the regime’s collapse have since proved premature. Yet the regime’s latest expansion does not resolve its core problems either, at best it mitigates them.
What has emerged over the summer is not a regime in free fall but one that is consolidating. Pulling back from the periphery, concentrating its forces where they matter most, and using battlefield momentum to paper over economic and political weaknesses.
The current escalation began in July 2026, when the Houthis tried to break what they call the “Saudi blockade” of Yemen by chartering an Iranian airliner for a roundtrip from Sanaa to Tehran. Riyadh has controlled Yemen’s airspace since 2015, when it launched its campaign to unseat the Houthis, and air traffic to and from Sanaa has been limited ever since. It diminished further in 2025, when Israel put Sanaa Airport and the Houthis’ fleet of airliners out of commission because the group had been using them to transport weapons and operatives. The blockade has never been airtight, though, as UN flights have reportedly continued in apparent secrecy and without any clear declaration of cargo or purpose.
Riyadh had folded under Houthi pressure many times before. Until 2023, the Saudis were desperate for a way out of Yemen, and the Houthis set out to extract every possible concession before running out the clock on a deal. The group’s Red Sea campaign, launched in November 2023, made any agreement far more difficult for the kingdom to stomach. Even so, Houthi threats against Saudi infrastructure continued to yield concessions or at least a softening of Saudi policy.
This time, Riyadh did not fold. On July 13, as an inbound flight from Tehran approached Sanaa, a coalition strike cratered the runway and forced the aircraft to divert to Hodeidah. The Houthis answered by declaring a “naval blockade” of Saudi shipping and attacking the kingdom’s energy infrastructure. Saudi Arabia hit back with airstrikes on Houthi-held territory, and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces went on the offensive.
The coalition’s pushback was limited, and it did not cow the Houthis who retain considerable will to fight. Its leaders are mostly in their 30s and 40s and remain filled with extremist fervor. They are not the aging cadres of the hollowed-out Assad regime. They are also accustomed to a ruthless and competitive environment in which the last thing anyone can afford to display is weakness.
Instead, the group recalibrated by absorbing losses in the east while going on the offensive in the west. In the northeastern governorate of al-Jawf, the Houthis have reportedly lost territory, including the al-Labanat military camp. They apparently did not commit the resources required to hold those positions.
That is surprising given al-Jawf’s history with the movement. Roughly two decades ago, when the Houthis had only just begun their revolt against the Yemeni government, al-Jawf became their second foothold. It is also a valuable smuggling hub and a likely entry point for materiel smuggled overland to the regime via Oman.
Yet al-Jawf has also been a thorn in the Houthis’ side for years because of its demography and topography, and it will remain one for whoever is left to govern its unruly tribes. The defeats there may therefore reflect a decision as much as a failure. Constrained by scarce resources, the Houthis appear to be consolidating around the assets they value most, accepting losses in al-Jawf in order to concentrate on the more strategically valuable western governorates. This does entail some risk as losing ground in the east strips away some of the group’s strategic depth.
That reading fits developments in Taiz and along the Red Sea coast. On September 3, the Houthis launched a ground offensive across western Taiz and southern Hodeidah against the National Resistance Forces of Tareq Saleh, nephew of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Within a week, the key port city of Mokha had fallen.
The captured territory secures the Houthis’ own ports, at least from a land invasion, and could allow the group to expand smuggling operations via the Horn of Africa. It may eventually position them to move on the city of Taiz itself. But the advance toward Bab al-Mandeb is less dramatic than it might appear, as shipping through the strait has been within Houthi reach for years so holding more coastline does not dramatically extend that threat.
The timing of the offensive may not be incidental. September is typically a tense month for the Houthis, as their level of popular support is put to the test. The regime seeks to bring Yemenis into the streets to celebrate its September 21, 2014, coup while silencing any celebration of the founding of the Yemeni Republic on September 26, 1962. The quick and surprising capture of Mokha from Saleh’s forces sustains the myth that the group is on the rise. That does nothing to alleviate discontent, but raising public fear of the regime helps keep discontent from turning into open dissent.
In doing so, the regime has used its primary tool, military power, to compensate for its other weaknesses. But this consolidation looks like crisis management. The regime’s central problems are economic as its main sources of revenue are drying up and it needs money and resources to keep its war machine going.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, finds itself dealing with Yemen largely on its own. It has pushed out its Emirati partners, and its American, Turkish, and Pakistani allies appear reluctant to commit to direct military intervention. Sidelining the Emiratis and disbanding the Southern Transitional Council gave Riyadh greater influence over the full spectrum of anti-Houthi forces, which it has since co-opted, but it is not clear that the Saudis are managing these relationships effectively.
The Houthi regime is neither a paper tiger nor ten feet tall. It should be assessed as a foe that is, above all, capable of surprise. Its summer offensive also shows that it can still generate momentum on the battlefield even as its economic base declines. Seeking to strike deals with or ignore this terrorist group has afforded it the luxury of preparing and then launching attacks at the time and place of its choosing.
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