Two years after Israel killed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah is weaker but not finished. WaTaawanou, a crowdfunded charity outside Hezbollah’s formal hierarchy, exemplifies one way Hezbollah endures: outsourcing part of the cost of sustaining – and retaining – its Shiite base. Israel eliminated its seniormost military and political leadership, over 5,000 fighters, and significant parts of its arsenal, while its finances are strained. Even as Tehran reportedly moved more than $1 billion to the group after the November 2024 ceasefire – and another $1 billion the following year – Bashar al-Assad’s fall has severely constricted Hezbollah’s transfer routes from Iran through Syria. Yet Hezbollah can survive and regenerate if it preserves the Shiite constituency supplying its manpower and, more importantly, domestic political protection.
WaTaawanou began as an informal relief campaign in November 2019. Founder Afif Shouman identifies it with Hezbollah’s “Resistance environment,” though in an October 2022 interview he said it “does not belong to Hezbollah.” Because WaTaawanou is not U.S.-sanctioned, it can solicit funds through channels Hezbollah’s designated institutions cannot use as freely, including Whish Money, OMT/Western Union, MoneyGram, and direct contributions. It also has an account at Hezbollah’s sanctioned quasi-bank, Al-Qard al-Hassan. Its public-relations director says most Lebanese donors give $5 or $10, but together fund larger campaigns. Whish closed WaTaawanou’s account in October 2025, but its websitestill lists Whish and bank transfers via an International Bank Account Number (IBAN), without usable details for either. Larger projects have drawn support from Lebanese private donors, expatriates, Iranian-linked organizations, and Iraq’s al-Sawaed tribal network.
Yet WaTaawanou’s formal separation from Hezbollah belies extensive ties. Shouman says Hezbollah was the only outside organization to embrace and assist it and credits its development to Nasrallah’s “direct and foundational guidance.” He says former Hezbollah Executive Council chairman Hashem Safieddine treated WaTaawanou as “a principal file.” WaTaawanou has repeatedly worked with Hezbollah’s Social Action apparatus and Islamic Health Committee. At least two volunteers—Ali Lutfi Faran and Amine Hassan Badreddine—served as Hezbollah fighters. Shouman said its 2024 wartime relief proceeded in “full coordination with Hezbollah.”
That relationship is clearest in its spending. Its beneficiaries extend beyond Hezbollah supporters, but its aid eases material pressure across the overwhelmingly Shiite base on which Hezbollah depends. Shouman says it aided 94,000 families during the 2024 war with food, medicine, cash, and shelter. Since the November 27 ceasefire, its Al-Wajh al-Hassan reconstruction project has used donations in war-damaged, overwhelmingly Shiite southern municipalities including Ramyeh, Houla, and Mays al-Jabal, installing prefabricated housing and classrooms, repairing schools, aiding farmers, and distributing food. WaTaawanou also channels money to Hezbollah-linked entities, including payments to Al-Rasoul al-Aazam Hospital and Saint Georges Hospital–Hadath, both Martyrs Foundation hospitals. It also purchased fuel from Amana Fuel, which the foundation controls through Atlas Holding. Treasury designated the Martyrs Foundation in 2007 and calls its Lebanon office an integral element of Hezbollah’s support network. WaTaawanou paid Hezbollah’s Islamic Health Committee through Dar al-Hawraa Medical Center and repeatedly paid Al Moukhtar Products, which Treasury designated as part of a Hezbollah business network.
WaTaawanou therefore gives Hezbollah two benefits: outside donors cover costs Hezbollah would otherwise bear, while WaTaawanou channels the credit back to Hezbollah. Nasrallah portraits line its premises, his face brands Al-Wajh al-Hassan, and Hezbollah flags and insignia appear at its events. Shouman says its role complements Hezbollah’s: Hezbollah’s fighters defend the community while WaTaawanou supports the group’s Shiite base.
WaTaawanou cannot alone explain Hezbollah’s Shiite support, but efforts on this scale likely help preserve it. Studiesshow many Shiites are drawn to Hezbollah less by ideology than by the security, services, and communal advancement it provides, while regular patronage recipients are likelier to oppose the group’s disarmament, support its political role, and credit it for reconstruction. That constituency remains overwhelmingly behind Hezbollah. A late 2024 survey found 85 percent trusted Hezbollah. An estimated 700,000–900,000 people attended Nasrallah’s February 2025 funeral, and three months later Hezbollah and the AMAL Movement, Lebanon’s other major Shiite party, dominated municipal elections in heavily Shiite southern and eastern districts. Gallup found in June-July 2025 that 69 percent opposed giving the Lebanese Army exclusive control over weapons. In April-May 2026, Information International found 87.5 percent opposed Hezbollah’s disarmament.
For Beirut, forcibly disarming Hezbollah therefore risks confronting not simply an armed organization, but one still backed by most of what is probably Lebanon’s largest sect. Lebanon has held no official census since 1932, but independent pollster Statistics Lebanon estimates Shiites at 32.2 percent of citizens. Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem has rejected disarmament even when paired with Israeli withdrawal, and on June 17, 2026 declared that “any project to disarm us will not pass.”
Lebanon has consequently paired categorical disarmament decisions with reluctance to enforce them coercively. On March 2, the cabinet banned Hezbollah’s military and security activity and ordered it to surrender its weapons, but Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said Beirut did “not seek a confrontation with Hezbollah,” while President Joseph Aoun insisted the state monopoly over arms proceed through dialogue “away from force.” Five days later, army commander Rodolph Haykal said national unity and internal stability came first and “the solution is not solely a military one.” In September, official sources said its Nabatieh deployment was not intended to make the city weapons-free. South Litani Sector deputy commander Colonel Raja Amer told CNN the army would proceed “slowly” rather than use violence against “our own people,” agreeing that avoiding another civil war was central to its approach.
On September 9, the army claimed “operational control” in three test zones under the U.S.-brokered June 26 Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement to clear unauthorized fighters, weapons, and military infrastructure. But it identified no Hezbollah fighter disarmed or arrested, and no Hezbollah depot, tunnel, or command center dismantled. WaTaawanou helps preserve the communal support that makes such coercion politically dangerous. For a battered Hezbollah, Beirut’s reluctance to test that support buys it the resource regeneration requires above all: time.
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
