Michael Leiter

Cipher Brief Expert Mike Leiter served in several senior national security positions in the federal government, to include as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) from 2007 until 2011 for both Presidents Bush and Obama.  This piece was first published by The Washington Post and was published here with permission from the author.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — One narrative emerging out of the tragedy in Afghanistan is both wrong and potentially counterproductive: the conclusion that our withdrawal represents a return to a pre-9/11 situation that puts us at risk in the same way that led to the deaths of almost 3,000 Americans 20 years ago.

Little if anything about Afghanistan has turned out as the United States had hoped when our military engagement began. But purely from a counterterrorism perspective, the United States and our allies have made incredible strides since 9/11 — in Afghanistan and beyond — that make us vastly safer than we were the last time the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. Moreover, the global Sunni violent extremist movement, while far from eradicated, has been weakened in important ways over two decades.

As a result, although the Taliban’s victory is a blow, we must guard against a response that is skewed by an un-nuanced, dated view of the terrorism threats we actually face in this new environment.

When al-Qaeda launched its horrific attacks in September 2001, it operated with near complete impunity in Afghanistan. Although the Taliban and al-Qaeda were not operationally linked, the protection and haven that al-Qaeda enjoyed allowed it to recruit and train operatives and deploy them around the globe. At the same time, the United States and its allies were poorly positioned to address such threats. Both individually and as a coordinated team, the U.S. counterterrorism community was unable to muster the resources, capabilities and focus to stop a relatively small group of committed plotters.

Two decades later, this picture is dramatically improved. The individual elements of the U.S. counterterrorism community are likely the most integrated part of the entire U.S. government. Add to this the global nature of allied counterterrorism efforts, and the result is a significant, worldwide network of allies that share information and coordinate operations in a manner wholly different than in 2001.

The return of a potential al-Qaeda or Islamic State haven in Afghanistan poses a clear challenge to Western counterterrorism capabilities, but it presents a significantly less threatening problem than was once the case. The lack of a robust physical presence for U.S. intelligence and Special Operations forces in Afghanistan — as well as the absence of a moderately able and trustworthy local partner — removes key capabilities and, in turn, protections.