If China attacked Taiwan tomorrow, the question might not be which aircraft carrier sails first to the Pacific, but whether a private company will activate satellite coverage over a small island. As Ukraine does today, Taiwan could soon depend on the choices of executives running commercial networks that sustain modern life. Ukraine’s wartime resilience has relied on more than 40,000 Starlink terminals and the voluntary actions of technology firms that became, in effect, auxiliary actors of national defense.
Strategic decisions once made only by governments—allocating aid, managing escalation, defining battlefield conditions—are now also being made by corporate boards and CEOs. These companies control platforms and infrastructure that shape the global balance of power. This is not an anomaly; it is the new reality of modern conflict.
America’s largest technology firms now command tools that function like strategic assets, weapons, and utilities. Satellite constellations and undersea cables are the new sea lanes of the digital era. Cloud infrastructure and AI systems are the power grids of national productivity and security. Semiconductors are the jet fuel of artificial and human intelligence as well as communication. Firms are no longer simply competitors in markets; they are multinational actors wielding levers of geopolitical influence. Their revenues exceed the GDP of many nations, and their governance decisions reverberate through global politics.
Yet, unlike in China where the state dictates corporate alignment, the United States leaves these questions to market forces and executive discretion. That gap is a strategic liability. In a Taiwan contingency, Washington cannot afford to discover in real time whether it can count on its own companies. The answer must be structured and understood in advance through a transparent framework that aligns economic incentives with national security.
This paper proposes such a framework: a public-private readiness framework (PPRF), modeled after Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) but oriented toward economic and technological preparedness. The PPRF would pre-negotiate expectations, responsibilities, and incentives between the U.S. government and critical technology firms. The goal is not coercion, but preemptive coordination—a framework that makes values-based alignment economically rational and reputationally rewarding.
Case Study: Ukraine Today, Taiwan Tomorrow
Ukraine demonstrates the stakes. When Russia invaded in 2022, Vice Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appealed directly to SpaceX for help. Within days, Starlink terminals arrived, sustaining command communications and civil infrastructure after Russian cyber and kinetic strikes. However, the same private network that enabled Ukraine’s defense also introduced new vulnerabilities. When Kyiv sought to extend Starlink coverage to support operations in Crimea, SpaceX declined, citing escalation concerns. Later, the company requested that the Pentagon assume financial responsibility for Ukraine’s access.
Microsoft, Amazon Web Services, and Google provided equally decisive, yet discretionary, support. They detected malware, migrated government data to secure cloud storage systems, and shielded Ukraine’s digital infrastructure from collapse. Their interventions, voluntary and unscripted, shaped the course of a sovereign nation’s survival.
Taiwan represents the next and far greater test. Chinese military doctrine targets communications infrastructure first: undersea cables, satellites, and energy grids. A successful first strike could digitally isolate the island. Whether Taiwan’s government, hospitals, and economy continue to function may depend on decisions made years before the first shot is fired in corporate boardrooms in Silicon Valley thousands of miles away.
Unlike Russia, China underpins global supply chains and is a lucrative consumer market for U.S. companies. Tesla, for example, operates large factories there; manufacturers of all industries remain dependent on Chinese rare earths and critical minerals. In contrast to hardware companies deeply tied to Chinese supply chains or markets, U.S. software firms such as Google and Microsoft began reducing their China exposure decades ago. Google’s 2010 decision to exit mainland China operations followed a major cyber-attack and disputes over content censorship.
This distinction exposes a key challenge: corporate behavior in conflict will correlate with how exposed a firm is to China. Firms with significant Chinese-market sales or Chinese supply chain dependencies face commercial and regulatory pressure that limits alignment with U.S. policy during crisis. By contrast, firms with less China exposure have greater freedom to act in U.S. and allied interests. Any readiness framework must therefore stratify members not only by capability, but also by strategic exposure to adversarial states.
The lesson from Ukraine and the looming test of Taiwan is clear: the United States cannot rely on ad hoc corporate goodwill. It must coordinate in advance, defining expectations before—not after—the first cyberattack or missile strike.
Proposal: A Big Tech SOFA
The United States should establish voluntary agreements with critical technology firms to clarify obligations and protections in national emergencies. Modeled after bilateral SOFAs but tailored to industry stakeholders, these agreements would lay out how companies would contribute to the national defense when vital infrastructure or networks are attacked.
Defined Obligations
Participating companies would commit to support contingency missions. A satellite provider would guarantee continuity of communications if undersea cables were cut. A cloud provider would surge cyber defense capabilities to critical infrastructure under coordinated government direction. A semiconductor firm would prioritize supply for defense and allied systems if global access were disrupted. Each obligation would be narrowly defined and scenario-based to preserve flexibility and ensure predictability.
Legal and Financial Clarity
Like traditional SOFAs, the framework would set terms for cost-sharing, liability protection, and legal jurisdiction. Companies would be able to predict how expenses, indemnities, and export-control compliance would be handled. This removes hesitation at moments of crisis, enabling decisive action without regulatory paralysis.
Operational Terms
The agreements would outline the conditions under which firms operate within the national security ecosystem. In return for commitments, industry participants would receive structured incentives—procurement preference, access to federal financing for surge capacity, fast-track security clearances for key staff, and reputational recognition as trusted national partners.
Participation would remain voluntary and discreet until activation. Companies could join through confidential
commitments, with public identification triggered only under crisis conditions. Exit clauses would allow either party to terminate or revise obligations as markets and technologies evolve.
Importantly, this framework would complement—not replace—existing authorities such as the Defense Production Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. These instruments can compel corporate action, but they are blunt, slow, and politically contentious, rendering them largely ineffective to scale in times of crisis. The PPRF offers a pre-negotiated, market-aligned alternative that relies on cooperation rather than coercion—it employs a carrot, versus stick, approach.
Concerns and Political Landscape
Any proposal to facilitate deeper cooperation between Washington and large technology firms will invite scrutiny—and rightly so. Antitrust critics will warn of facilitating corporate entrenchment and eroding competition for new actors. Free market and small business champions will object to industrial favoritism and market distortion. Privacy advocates will fear data-sharing overreach and civil liberties violations. Fiscal hawks will balk at financial guarantees.
These agreements must build in protections to address these valid concerns and ensure proper congressional oversight. Industry participation should be divided into two tiers: Big Tech and Little Tech. Big Tech are systemically critical firms—such as satellite, cloud, and semiconductor leaders—that carry higher obligations and barriers to entry. Little Tech are emerging innovators—such as AI startups, cybersecurity vendors, and mesh-network developers—that can participate through subcontracting opportunities or competitive federal innovation programs like Small Business Innovation Research, Other Transaction Authorities, and technology pilot initiatives.
This tiered model preserves competition, avoids entrenching incumbents, and turns the framework into a mobility pathway for new entrants rather than a closed club for existing giants. Structured participation also replaces arbitrary, executive-level decision-making with accountable, transparent coordination between industry and government.
From a policy standpoint, the PPRF has broad appeal. National security wonks will see it as a deterrence multiplier, economic pragmatists as an industrial policy that strengthens resilience, and fiscal hawks as a cost-effective alternative to crisis bailouts.
Conclusion: Mobilize Before the First Shot
Wars are not won by improvisation. They are won by preparation. In World War II, U.S. factories retooled to become the “arsenal of democracy.” In the next conflict, the decisive question may not concern steel or oil, but whether America’s digital engines—its satellites, chips, and cloud networks—align with their own nation in its hour of need.
The public-private readiness framework offers a way to align profit with principle, foresight with flexibility, and corporate power with democratic accountability. It ensures that when the first cables are cut and the first systems go dark, the United States will not be negotiating under fire.
The time to define that cooperation—quietly, clearly, and credibly—is now.
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Microsoft, nor any other affiliated organization or employer.
Michael Salazar is a senior manager for Microsoft AI & Security.
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