The True Toll of Sanctions on Tehran

BOOK REVIEWHow Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare

by Narges Bajoghli, Vali Nasr, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, and Ali Vaez / Simon & Schuster

Reviewed by Andy Dunn, former CIA Deputy Assistant Director

The Reviewer — Andy Dunn retired from the CIA in October 2021 after a 29-year career as an analyst and Agency leader. He last served as Deputy Assistant Director of the Near East Mission Center from 2020 to 2021 and as Chief of Analysis in the Iran Mission Center from 2018 to 2020. Iran and the violence perpetrated by its proxies and partners in the region were the major focus of these units. Previous assignments included multiple leadership jobs in the Counterterrorism Mission Center and two war zone tours. 

REVIEW:  How Sanctions Work, by an all-star cast of US-based academic experts on Iran, does some things well. But not many. It is a wasted opportunity for a serious, real-world examination of the efficacy of sanctions as a policy tool. The authors do provide an engaging, comprehensive history of US and, to a lesser degree, international sanctions on Iran dating back to 1979. They also make a persuasive case that the Iranian regime has mostly successfully weathered the economic constraints imposed by sanctions to what Tehran judges to be its core interests and goals—regime survival (a very different goal than prosperity for the mass of Iranians), the destruction of Israel, and replacing the US as the dominant security actor in the region. Ultimately, though, the book edges too close to being an apologia for a brutal, widely despised regime, instead implausibly blaming the US for Iran’s dire economic conditions. By saying that sanctions mostly don’t work and should be abandoned without offering any credible alterations or alternatives, the authors are both wrong and illustrate how disconnected they are from the messy reality of imperfect choices and imperfect outcomes faced by policymakers in every administration. The authors too often seek to place the blame for the suffering of Iran’s people on the United States instead of where it so clearly belongs—the priorities of Iran’s authoritarian Supreme Leader and the repressive theocratic and security state he leads.

First, the book’s strengths. If you want a concise, detailed history of US sanctions imposed on the Iranian Government going back to 1979, How Sanctions Work delivers. The United States and Iran have been in a near-constant state of undulating crisis and conflict since that time, and the authors provide a crash course of the twists and turns of US and global sanctions policies and Iran’s reactions. The breadth and compounding complexity of US sanctions, in particular, are both a feature and a bug. The sanctions have sometimes achieved their objectives, but also have proved hard to roll back during brief interludes of engagement between Tehran and Washington (the JCPOA agreement being the most recent). Everything in Washington is messy and some of the more interesting passages of the book detail Congressional involvement in imposing sanctions—often as much to embarrass or constrain the US president du jour as to hurt Iran. And it wouldn’t be a story about Washington if it didn’t detail internecine policy fights or widely varying goals within administrations. Some in the Trump administration, for example, supported reimposing sanctions on Tehran with nearly-impossible conditions attached because what they really wanted was punishment without engagement. Other, generally more junior officials, were absurdly near-certain that Iran would capitulate to US pressure quickly and agree to talk about issues beyond the nuclear file, including Tehran’s missile program and support for regional militias.

The authors also correctly assess that the Iranian Government has mostly weathered sanctions if you measure success by the regime’s robust network of allied terrorist groups and its ability to attack its enemies—primarily Israel. But this is also where the book begins to go off the rails. Tehran has relentlessly built a network of militant allies and partners (which the authors absurdly characterize in several places as merely “alleged” support for these groups) and has successfully moved the front lines of its conflict with Israel to Israel itself. Jerusalem is now mostly forced to react to direct or indirect Iranian pressure, and we have unfortunately reached the stage where what passes for restraint on the part of the Iranian regime is the primary obstacle to the country building a nuclear device. Iran also has built a missile force that allows it to credibly retaliate for attacks on Iranian interests, as we saw in April when Tehran launched a barrage of ballistic missiles at Israel. All of this is indisputably true. And none of it is an argument against sanctions as one tool to constrain Tehran. Iran would have reached these milestones sooner and, especially regarding its missile and nuclear programs, built more robust capabilities but for US and international sanctions. Nor do the authors anywhere address the consequences of a do nothing sanctions policy on our relationships with Iran’s neighbors—and their relationships with Tehran and each other. This is one of many examples where the book ignores the messy realities of leading the (admittedly now diminished) Pax Americana in the real world.

Much of the text is devoted to the economic woes that drive domestic discontent we so often see manifested in mass anti-regime demonstrations, followed like clockwork by regime violence against its own people and patient retribution against protest leaders. The authors’ accounts of economic dislocation and deprivation are numerous and credible and disturbing. Iranians today are worse off economically than they were when the Shah was deposed, a tragedy in a country with a large, entrepreneurial, and educated population. The authors squarely place responsibility for this lamentable state of affairs on…the United States. This is where the book loses any claim it might have to being useful in the real world.  Barely a peep is heard, for example, about the IRGC-affiliated bonyads, which are para-governmental investment organizations. Bonyads for decades have had a privileged place in Iran’s economy and politics and warp markets and policymaking solely to enrich regime supporters, de facto contributing to the impoverishment of those who are not. And ignored from beginning to end is the foundational problem with Iran’s theocracy that is the reason the United States and the international community have resorted to sanctions in the first place. The Iranian regime cares first and foremost about meddling in the affairs of its neighbors—often by sponsoring armed shadow governments that breed resentment from Iraq to Lebanon—restoring Iran’s long vanished regional hegemony, and, oh, let’s not forget, the annihilation of the State of Israel. None of these are the priorities of Iran’s people, even if there is nominal support for some of them. The authors repeatedly claim the Iranian people are being victimized by sanctions (and I do not question sanctions contribute substantially to widespread economic misery), but Iran’s people are first and foremost victims of a regime the demise of which would be joyfully welcomed by most of its citizens.

The final chapter illustrates in just a few pages the many flaws and fallacies that permeate this book. For example, the authors boldly claim that the “efficacy of sanctions is open to question.” Well, no kidding. But their solution—don’t impose sanctions or do much of anything else to check the Iranian regime’s ambitions—is detached from geopolitical and domestic political reality. They repeatedly return to the theme that sanctions constitute an “invisible war” with long-term casualties commensurate with military conflict. Perhaps, but again, the authors blame everyone but the ayatollahs, implausibly absolving the regime of nearly all responsibility for the economic deprivations faced by the general population. The authors also lament that sanctions “have not reduced tensions between Iran and the US” and are a “tool for creating an enemy.” These quotes serve only to illustrate where the authors’ true sympathies seem to lie—with the Iranian regime. Sanctions are meant to constrain Iran’s ability to achieve its imperial ambitions—ambitions that are resented by many Iranians and all of its neighbors. Nor have sanctions made the United States an enemy of Iran; antipathy toward the United States is fundamental to the regime’s raison d’etre and is a crutch for a regime increasingly devoid of legitimacy. Whatever good points the book makes about the drawbacks of sanctions—and it squeezes in a few—are lost in a swamp of sympathy for a regime that deserves none.

How Sanctions Work earns a disappointing 1.5 out of 4 trench coats

1.5

The Cipher Brief participates in the Amazon Affiliate program and may make a small commission from purchases made via links.

Interested in submitting a book review?  Send an email to [email protected] with your idea.

Sign up for our free Undercover newsletter to make sure you stay on top of all of the new releases and expert reviews.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.


More Book Reviews

Search

Close