BOOK REVIEW: Shadow Strike: Inside Israel’s Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power
By Yaakov Katz
Reviewed by Marc Polymeropoulos
Marc Polymeropoulos served 26 years in the CIA before retiring from the Senior Intelligence Service in June 2019. His positions included field and headquarters operational assignments covering the Middle East, Europe, Eurasia and CounterTerrorism.
On September 6, 2007, a transformative event occurred in the Middle East that only today can truly be appreciated for its importance. Late at night, a small strike package of Israeli Air Force F-16s and F-15s destroyed with pinpoint precision a nuclear reactor being built by North Korea deep in the Syrian desert. Shadow Strike, Inside Israel’s Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power by Yaakov Katz is an insider view of the secret operation.
The book is written in the style of Bob Woodward, where you feel you are at the table both in Israeli and American foreign policy circles. Shadow Strike reads like a spy thriller, and as a longtime operations officer in CIA’s Near East Division who worked for years on the Syria portfolio, I found myself completely absorbed throughout the narrative. Shadow Strike is also a story of the interaction between allies Israel and the United States-whose ultimate goal remained the same, but whose means greatly differed.
The location of the strike was significant. The nuclear reactor was built deliberately deep inside Syria in a remote desert location near the town of Dayr al-Zur in order to avoid both US and Israeli reconnaissance. Given the events in Syria that later transpired — in which Dayr al-Zur became a stronghold of ISIS during the Syrian civil war— one can only imagine what would have occurred if the reactor had not been destroyed and had fallen under ISIS control. In hindsight, the Israeli action benefited not only Israeli security, but the international community as well.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert comes across as a complicated character in this book — no doubt because in the end and separate from this operation, he served a jail sentence for corruption. Katz does not excuse OImert for this behavior nor question his guilt. He addresses it matter of factly and without opinion. What also is clear is that Israeli politicians — perhaps far more than their American compatriots — are often charged by their political rivals with undertaking military campaigns for their own political benefit — true “wag the dog” moments. Ultimately, however, Olmert’s performance during this crisis was admirable and should be studied by historians. The previous summer’s Lebanon war hangs over his head like an albatross, and his burning desire for Israel to regain a deterrent capability after the Lebanon debacle is a main theme through the book.
Some political biases from Katz are evident, with his less than subtle and repeated praise for the perceived wisdom of U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney. The book glosses over Cheney’s extraordinary failures in the Iraq War fiasco, and ultimately it is clear that in Cheney’s cries of alarm for various worst-case scenarios across the region, he simply got the Syrian nuclear file right. I also note that Katz is the editor in chief of the right-wing leaning Jerusalem Post, so perhaps this explains some of his political biases. This does not diminish in any way the enjoyment I found in reading the book, but it should be pointed out to the reader, particularly those that are not immersed in Israeli politics.
On the US side, the intelligence fiasco over Iraq WMD hangs over all U.S. foreign policy decision making during the crisis. It was simply impossible for the Bush administration—and certainly for President Bush himself— to authorize a unilateral U.S. strike based solely on foreign government intelligence service reporting after the failure of the U.S. intelligence community with regards to the Iraqi WMD program. Bush recognized the U.S. public would not support any such military action. However, Bush remained a stalwart supporter of Israel and of Olmert in particular. While National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates were very much opposed to a military solution to the crisis, Bush appears sympathetic to Olmert’s predicament. In one illuminating passage, Katz reveals that Bush told Olmert after the Israeli strike that the U.S. would without hesitation back Israel militarily in the event that hostilities broke out.
Katz clearly has an affinity for Mossad chief Meir Dagan, a near mythic figure in the intelligence world. Having met Dagan, I can only add that his small physical stature and informal style masked a fierce and no-nonsense warrior, exactly as described by Katz. Dagan brought the Mossad back to relevance and deeply believed in the US-Israeli intelligence relationship. Also stressed by Katz—and observed first-hand by this reviewer—Dagan was revered by the rank and file of Mossad. As in all crises, personalities of the key participants do indeed matter, and it is very fortunate that Dagan was in a position of authority as Israel so expertly danced through the raindrops in ultimately achieving all of their tactical and strategic objectives in the operation.
The background on other Israeli national security officials was quite interesting as well. Katz relays an oft told story of three Israeli F-15s in 2003 flying over the former death camp in Auschwitz, Poland as a show of Israeli strength. The Israeli ethos of “never again” and “we will rely only on ourselves” is ingrained in the Israeli national security establishment and must be understood as we assess national security decision making in Israel.
As noted by Katz, Israel held firm to their doctrine that operations should exist within a “zone of deniability.” This meant that—similar to a covert action operation in the traditional sense practiced by the CIA—an overt event occurs (the destruction of the reactor, for example), but no actor takes credit. This silence offers numerous strategic advantages to the practitioner. Israel believed that if Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was not embarrassed and humiliated by the strike, he would not feel it critical to retaliate to save face for the regime, and thus a wider regional war could be avoided. Katz credits IDF Military Intelligence for pushing this option during the crisis. The Israelis threaded the needle in near perfect fashion post-strike, as they have always understood that Bashar cared for only one thing - to remain in power.
Katz’s chapter on Bashar was most illuminating to me, as I too have followed the Syrian president for many decades. While the Israelis were quite keen in pursuing a peace deal with Syria in the time prior to Hafez al-Assad’s death, they realized probably correctly that Bashar, upon ascending to the presidency, was not strong enough to conclude a deal. Instead, Bashar needed to consolidate his power, as a perceived bad deal would threaten his hold on the country, with the old guard still in control of Syria’s security services. This internal power struggle in Syria was missed by much of the media, who so often wrote fawning stories of the western educated eye doctor-turned President, with an investment banker as a wife. Finally, unlike Katz’s accounts of US and Israeli officials, it is simply impossible to gain any first or even second-hand knowledge of what Bashar was thinking in building this reactor. Most importantly, Katz raises the question as to when construction on the reactor began. If it started and quickly progressed under Bashar, perhaps this would undermine some of the arguments at the time that Bashar was a true reformer.
I would be remiss if I did not mention current events in the region, in which the U.S. recently conducted an overt military strike killing IRGC General Qassem Soleimani. Unlike Olmert’s actions regarding the Israeli strike on Dayr al-Zur, President Trump felt the need to speak about the strike in public. The US administration’s argument to publicize such actions centers on the perceived need to regain US deterrent capabilities vis a vis Iran. Yet Israel certainly achieved the same deterrent effect in Syria with silence. Katz also raises the potential for a future Israeli unilateral strike on Iran and believed that the U.S. reluctance to strike the reactor in Syria may affect future Israeli thinking on Iran. Perhaps President Trump’s actions in killing Soleimani will give the Israelis some comfort that they will not always have to go it alone with regard to Iran.
I enjoyed the book immensely. As I had a front row seat to this historical event in the Middle East, I found much of the account to be accurate. It brought back memories of the tension, fear, and ultimately awe we felt in watching the Israelis deal with such an existential problem and do so in a manner that did not lead to regional conflagration. Olmert, who was indicted and subsequently jailed for corruption, nonetheless will go down in history as having navigated this crisis in the finest of fashions. The world indeed owes him a debt of gratitude.
This book earns a solid three out of four trench coats.
Disclaimer: The Cipher Brief, like other Amazon Affiliate partners, gets paid a small commission based on purchases made via the links provided in this review
Read more Under/Cover book reviews in The Cipher Brief
Read Under/Cover interviews with authors and publishers in The Cipher Brief
Interested in submitting a book review? Check out our guidelines here
Sign up for our free Undercover newsletter to make sure you stay on top of all of the new releases and expert reviews
Read more expert national security perspectives and analysis in The Cipher Brief
