The Germans as Future Partners

BOOK REVIEW: OUT OF THE DARKNESS: The Germans 1942 – 2022

By Frank Trentmann / Alfred A. Knopf

Reviewed by: Bill Rapp

The Reviewer Bill Rapp holds a Ph.D. in European History and taught at Iowa State University before joining the CIA. He served over 35 years as an analyst, diplomat, and senior executive before retiring as a member of the Senior Intelligence Service in 2017.  He continues to work part-time for the Agency as a consultant and trainer and was awarded the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal upon his retirement.  Bill also has a fictional five-book Cold War Thriller series, with the sixth book, Assignment in Saigon, due out in 2025.

REVIEW — During my assignment in London from 2014 to 2017, I asked a colleague at the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) if the European Union leaders would renew their sanctions against Russia for its seizure of Crimea and poorly disguised aggression in eastern Ukraine.  As designed, the EU’s sanctions had to be renewed — by unanimous consent — every six months.  My British colleague smiled, shrugged, and said, “It all depends on what the Mother Superior wants.”  He was referring, of course, to Germany’s then-Chancellor Angela Merkel.

The response was telling on two counts.  First, it recognized the potential for leadership that Chancellor Merkel—and her country—enjoyed in Europe, something few observers would have predicted as Germany struggled to rebuild and redefine itself after its collapse in 1945.  The comment, however, also betrayed a sense of uncertainty over how Germany would exercise that leadership, given the legacy of its troubled past and its avoidance of anything resembling a more active political and military role as Europe’s most populous country and its most powerful economy.   As such, the remark reflected the concerns many in the West have shared over where Germany is heading, how it plans to get there, and just what it will do once it arrives.  And those concerns are even more pressing today as the Germans and their European neighbors face an expansionist and aggressive Russia that needs to be confronted and contained by a united Western alliance, whose success will depend, in large part, on the role Germany is prepared to play.  This has become glaringly clear during the war in Ukraine; whatever its outcome, Ukraine will need a degree of support and security guarantees that will demand the direct participation of that country’s Western partners, especially Germany, given its growing geopolitical importance and reluctance to use that importance in the past.  

Frank Trentmann’s new history on post-war Germany, Out of the Darkness: The Germans 1942 – 2022,  offers an encouraging perspective on that country’s evolution as a stable, liberal democracy that has become increasingly aware of the external forces that helped shape its success after 1945.  The question remains, however, of whether or when the Germans will be prepared to become more actively engaged in the campaigns to influence and direct those forces themselves.

Trentmann, a professor of history at the Universities of London and Helsinki, is by no means uncritical of Germany’s performance on a range of issues over the past 80 years.  He begins with the defeat at Stalingrad and the massive firebombing of Hamburg when the Germans first faced the realization that their armies were not invincible, and that defeat was now a very real prospect.  Along with the fear of retribution for the war crimes a majority only now claimed to be aware of, the Germans created a consensus (or an excuse) that they, too, were a nation of victims.  Not only had the Germans suffered wholesale destruction and massive casualties, they had also been coerced or duped into serving a criminal regime.  The soldiers who fought in the Wehrmacht, therefore, performed an honorable service to their nation and the battle against communism.  This sense of victimhood spilled over into the early post-war years, as the Germans sought to avoid personal responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi regime, which severely limited the reach and impact of denazification.  Rather than focus on the past, Konrad Adenauer (West Germany’s first chancellor} led them toward a vision of the future that concentrated on rebuilding the economy, integrating the huge flow of refugees from Germany’s former territories in the east, and establishing this new nation firmly in Western Europe.  Meanwhile, the emergence of the Cold War provided a helpful context and a new raison d’etre, while the state’s assumption of the task of punishing the few Nazis it persecuted allowed the Germans to avoid grappling with their own role in supporting the past regime and to concentrate instead on the immediate task of rebuilding their country.

Still, the seeds of democracy and a civic society did take root, and by the 1960s West Germany possessed a thriving multiparty political culture, a prosperous economy, the rule of law, an engaged citizenry with a high voter turnout, and a public space for open debate.  In the Bundeswehr it even had an army committed to the democratic state despite the heavy involvement of former Wehrmacht officers. 


Subscriber+Members have a higher level of access to Cipher Brief Expert Perspectives and get exclusive access to The Dead Drop, the best national security gossip publication, if we do say so ourselves.  Find out what you’re missing. Upgrade your access toSubscriber+ now.


In Trentmann’s view, perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the Germans was their absorption in their own sufferings and self-anointed victimhood — as opposed to that of their victims — and their lack of understanding and appreciation for events and developments beyond their borders.  That, too changed during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, though, as efforts to create a European Community (and later, a Union), extensive travel abroad, the emergence of civic action groups promoting greater awareness of German crimes during the war, the surge in guest workers and immigrants, and the growth in anti-nuclear, environmental, and peace movements increased on a broad scale.

The German Democratic Republic in the east was a different story, and Trentmann examines how its mythical origins as an anti-fascist state, its debt and loyalty to the Soviet Union, and its bungled attempt to create a consumer society of its own under its leader from the Socialist Unity Party (SED), Erich Honecker, led to one failure after another.  By the late 1980s, the absence of popular support for and commitment to the half-state, the obvious preference of many of its inhabitants for life in the other Germany, and its bankrupt economy makes one wonder how the GDR was able to survive as long as it did.  One answer, of course, was the pervasive presence of the Stasi and the Soviet Army.  Moreover, the regime, by expelling its dissidents and blocking an avenue for dissent or criticism, lived under the illusion that it was actually popular.

All that came to end in 1989 with the fall of the Wall and the reunification of Germany through the Federal Republic’s absorption of its eastern little brother.  Germany has experienced many Wende, or turns, in its postwar lifetime, but reunification was arguably its most significant.  The Cold War had given the Federal Republic the justification for its emergence as a semi-independent state, not to mention its new identity.  It had also limited Germany’s political and military obligations in a divided continent, with the responsibility for the country’s security effectively farmed out to the United States and NATO. 

Now, the reunited Germany would have to find a new role for itself at the heart of Europe.   And that included resolving an issue that had been a critical element in the country’s postwar political discourse: should Germany assume a larger role in the continent’s defense and even engage in military campaigns beyond Germany’s borders?   After initial steps in the Balkans and Afghanistan — which sparked the usual debates over the potential for German revanchism and military conquest — that particular issue appears to have been settled. 

Almost.  The war in Ukraine has resurfaced some of that, as Germans continue to argue over whether their country is obligated to avoid involvement in a military conflict and simply press for a negotiated solution, or whether the FRG’s commitment to European security and its defense of democratic and humanitarian values requires an active military role common to adult nations.  Berlin’s initial steps—like those of many others—now look overly cautious, prompting critical, even harsh commentary and press coverage.  The Scholz Government faced some ridicule, for example, over its offer of helmets at the outset of the conflict.  And this hesitancy persists in some areas, such as in the reluctance to share the long-range German-Swedish Taurus cruise missile with Ukraine. 

That is where Trentmann leaves the reader.  Yet, further reflection suggests that there is reason for optimism.  Since 2022, Germany’s military contributions to Ukraine’s defense have been second only to those of the United States, as Leopard tanks, Patriot missile batteries, artillery, and ammunition have overtaken headgear in the German inventory.  German leaders, including Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, have also been among the most outspoken and most traveled European leaders urging greater contributions and a lasting commitment to the collective defense of Ukraine’s future.  They have also highlighted the perception of the enduring Russian threat to Europe’s own future of democratic governance and regional security, taking an active role in combatting Russian disinformation, hacking, and assassination campaigns, expelling numerous intelligence operatives in the process.  Moreover, the Germans, whose economic interests have often been at odds with their professed foreign and security policies and values, handled the voluntary loss of cheap Russian energy with surprising success. 

Out of the Darkness closes with the admonition that one should not exaggerate Germany’s vulnerabilities.  Over the past 80 years, the country has demonstrated its resilience and stability in responding to the threats of homegrown terrorism in the 1970s — when the center held — and the challenges of reconstruction, reunification, and the integration of two million refugees after the war and approximately a million more non-Germans this century.  It hasn’t been easy, but the country has shown an ability to learn from its past and adapt to its future.  The verdict is still out as to whether Germany can supply the leadership needed to help construct a unified, determined, and enduring European response that will protect Ukraine and its neighbors from further Russian threats to their existence, regardless of how the current war turns out.  That response from our most important allies, including Germany, will play a large part in determining whether the West succeeds in keeping Putin’s Russia at bay.   

Out of the Darkness earns a prestigious 4 out of 4 trench coats

4

The Cipher Brief participates in the Amazon Affiliate program and may make a small commission from purchases made via links.

Interested in submitting a book review?  Send an email to [email protected] with your idea.

Sign up for our free Undercover newsletter to make sure you stay on top of all of the new releases and expert reviews.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.


More Book Reviews

Search

Close