BOOK REVIEW: Secrets and Spies: UK Intelligence Accountability After Iraq and Snowden
By Jamie Gaskarth
Reviewed by Nick Fishwick
Cipher Brief Expert Nick Fishwick CMG retired in 2012 after nearly thirty years in the British Foreign Service. He did postings in Lagos, Istanbul and Kabul. His responsibilities in London included director of security and, after returning from Afghanistan in 2007, director for counterterrorism. His final role was as director general for international operations.
What a joy it is, in one’s declining years, to see a growing body of intelligent, well-researched and enlightening literature about British intelligence. Thirty or forty years ago, we in Britain were stuck with terrible books by right-wing lunatics like Chapman Pincher about “MI5” and “MI6” with “revelations” that so and so was a Soviet agent, followed by a revelation that no, he wasn’t, somebody else was, etc; while left wing journalists hunted around in the dustbins for more “revelations” of all the terrible things British Intelligence had supposedly done. The only academics who wrote about intelligence were generally bad ones who weren’t smart enough to research serious subjects.
Gradually, this has changed. Politicians, press and public have become increasingly less content to be told to mind their own business about intelligence which is, after all, financed by their taxes. The end of the Cold War and the rise of counterterrorism, which has required more active public assent, has made the case for absolute secrecy less obvious and compelling. Inquiries like Butler (2004) and Chilcot (2016) have put a huge amount of information about the workings of the intelligence agencies in the public domain, for those who can be bothered to read the reports (and its surprising how many “experts” can’t be bothered).
Jamie Gaskarth’s little book is a further useful contribution to the understanding of British intelligence. The rules of academic etiquette have to be observed, of course: at the beginning of the book he tells us what he is going to do; then he does it; then at the end he tells us he has done it. Nice and transparent, I suppose. There is an eye-watering introductory section on “methodology”. Gaskarth gives us lumbering terms like “vernacular accountability” (though it turns out to be a key concept) and I found myself anticipating a few grim hours of reading. Actually, it turns out to be a fair, sensitive and judicious piece of work that breaks new ground.
This is because Gaskarth has spoken to people who worked and, apparently, in some cases still work in British intelligence and he listens carefully to what they have to say. This is where “vernacular accountability” comes in. By this, he means the informal, everyday ways and internal mechanisms through which intelligence and other officials discuss what they are doing, whether it’s right and sensible: as he puts it, “how internal beliefs, norms and routines shape practice”. And he faithfully captures what this amounts to. He describes the rigours of the process by which SIS (MI6) has to submit operational proposals to foreign office ministers and senior officials. He notes the continuing attempts made by SIS, MI5 and GCHQ to reach out to and listen to their own staff and that the informal hierarchies of these agencies have generally (though with some sad exceptions) made it relatively easy for “junior” officials to question and make their views known to the leadership.
Gaskarth does a good job in explaining the formal ways in which British intelligence has been increasingly held to account over the past thirty years, shows how they overlap, and discusses how they work and their limitations (if they’re too polite to the agencies they don’t hold them to account, if they’re too intrusive the agencies don’t feel comfortable accounting to them). He also shows how people mean different things by accountability, and he quotes one official tellingly - “There is probably more scrutiny of a secret agency than of a conventional government department”.
Gaskarth is clear about the flaws and limitations of British intelligence accountability but his overall picture suggests that it could be a lot worse and is on an upward trajectory. He is cautious about some proposals to make British intelligence even more accountable - apparently some have argued for financial incentivisation of whistleblowers, but he can see how that would probably end up in a horrible place. His own proposals, for example public ethics committees engaging with the agencies, are actually pretty modest.
The only argument I really question is a secondary one - he claims it as a failing that British intelligence failed to predict various events. Western governments and those who elect them may need to form a view on whether they want their secret agencies wandering around trying to predict things, or whether that is best left in most cases to open source, and analysts in government, think tanks and the private sector. The British system tells its agencies in some detail what requirements it wants them to focus on and leaves the crystal-ball gazing to others.
This book earns a solid three out of four trench coats.
Disclaimer: The Cipher Brief, like other Amazon Affiliate partners, gets paid a small commission based on purchases made via the links provided in this review
Read more Under/Cover book reviews in The Cipher Brief
Read Under/Cover interviews with authors and publishers in The Cipher Brief
Interested in submitting a book review? Check out our guidelines here
Sign up for our free Undercover newsletter to make sure you stay on top of all of the new releases and expert reviews
Read more expert national security perspectives and analysis in The Cipher Brief
