DEEP DIVE — More than six weeks after United States special forces extracted Nicolás Maduro from Caracas, Venezuela remains under the control of the same intelligence apparatus that ran the regime’s torture networks. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, who oversaw the feared Bolivarian intelligence service under Maduro, now negotiates sanctions relief with Washington while security hardliners who detained political prisoners coordinate their release.
For much of the U.S. intelligence community, however, it is not about whether Venezuela’s system can be repaired, but rather whether the Trump administration has enough leverage to prevent the old guard from rebranding.
Rather than triggering immediate elections as Venezuelan law requires, the Supreme Court declared Maduro’s capture a temporary absence, allowing Rodríguez to govern indefinitely without a popular mandate.
“The regime used a legal mechanism to maintain institutional control while avoiding an immediate electoral process,” Mauricio Vaquero, country coordinator for María Corina Machado’s Vente Venezuela party in Colombia, tells The Cipher Brief. “The Supreme Court decided she would assume as interim president, but a Chavista Supreme Court, not the democratic legal one.”
In other words, the same loyalist judges who helped Maduro stay in power are now using constitutional loopholes to keep his inner circle in charge.
The Intelligence Network Remains Intact
The security apparatus that sustained Maduro’s authoritarian rule continues operating largely unchanged. Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, still wanted by American authorities on a $25 million bounty for narco-terrorism charges, controls Venezuela’s coercive forces and armed collectives. His role in coordinating political prisoner releases illustrates the paradox of the current transition.
Foro Penal, Venezuela’s leading human rights organization that has provided pro bono legal assistance to victims of arbitrary detention since 2002, estimates that approximately 711 political prisoners are detained as of mid-February. Releases often come with severe restrictions. When opposition politician Juan Pablo Guanipa was freed on February 8 after eight months of detention, armed men abducted him hours later. He is now under house arrest with an ankle monitor.
“They were released, they reunited with their families, until the enlightened stupidity of some politicians led them to believe they could do whatever they wanted and stir up trouble in the country,” Cabello stated after Guanipa’s re-arrest.
Luis Bustos, the Bogotá-based spokesperson for the Venezuelan opposition party Primero Justicia, tells The Cipher Brief that his party alone has 61 members imprisoned as political prisoners.
“There is still a high risk of getting arrested if authorities are aware that you are happy about the situation,” Bustos continues.
In Caracas and popular zones, armed collectives demonstrate the regime’s ability to maintain social control outside of formal state structures.
“After Maduro’s arrest, a circular went out saying that opposition supporters would be captured and obviously alluding to actions of justice by these groups,” Vaquero insists. “So repression itself has not diminished, not in a constant way, not in a sustainable way.”
Elections: A Constitutional Impossibility
Venezuelan opposition figures and Washington officials increasingly acknowledge that legitimate elections cannot take place in the near term. The electoral system’s corruption under Chavismo extends beyond fraudulent vote counting to fundamental issues of voter registry manipulation and military involvement.
“This government put deceased people to vote,” Vaquero claims. “This government gave identity cards indiscriminately to Cubans, to Russians, to Chinese, to people from FARC, to people from ELN.”
María Corina Machado, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate leading Venezuela’s unified opposition, estimated in early February that transparent elections using manual voting could take place within 9 to 10 months. However, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, Delcy’s brother and key regime interlocutor with Washington, ruled out elections in the near future, citing the need for stabilization.
Need a daily dose of reality on national and global security issues? Subscriber to The Cipher Brief’s Nightcap newsletter, delivering expert insights on today’s events – right to your inbox. Sign up for free today.
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt has echoed the administration’s reluctance to commit to an electoral timeline. When pressed on when elections might be held, Leavitt stated: “It’s too premature and too early to dictate a timetable for elections in Venezuela right now.” She emphasized that the administration has “maximum leverage over the interim authorities in Venezuela,” and that “their decisions are going to continue to be dictated by the United States of America.”
The constitutional framework technically allows Acting President Rodríguez to serve 90 days, with a possible ninety-day extension if approved by the Chavista-controlled National Assembly. Temporary absence provisions, however, are interpreted creatively by the Supreme Court, which effectively eliminates any firm deadlines.
A U.S. intelligence official focused on Latin America issues, speaking on background to The Cipher Brief, estimates that credible elections extend well beyond constitutional requirements. The source highlights that comprehensive electoral reform requires dismantling power structures that are still firmly entrenched.
Bustos also underscores that elections might realistically occur as early as next year.
“We need first of all to get a country more stable,” he says. “We need to put our institutions on stronger foundations.”
Without functioning democratic institutions, independent electoral authorities, or international oversight mechanisms in place, any rushed election would ratify the status quo. Under current conditions, elections would not be free or fair because the regime controls voters’ registries and ballots. As long as the same power structure is still in place, cosmetic reforms cannot address this fundamental barrier.
Leverage and Limitations
Despite these obstacles, the Trump administration can drive genuine change by maintaining pressure through its military presence and negotiations over sanctions relief. It appears, however, that the regime is trying to outlast Washington’s attention by complying tactically with American demands while maintaining fundamental power structures.
Paola Salazar, director for Medellín and Antioquia state at Colombia’s government migration agency, Migración Colombia, tells The Cipher Brief that pendular migratory flows between Colombia and Venezuela have remained stable since January 3, suggesting Venezuelans are not yet convinced conditions have fundamentally changed.
Moreover, Alejandro Méndez Hernández, a Venezuelan community organizer in Bogotá, tells The Cipher Brief that trust is still absent, hence migrants are not returning despite Maduro’s removal.
“We have a huge amount of Venezuelans being arrested as political prisoners, who haven’t been released until today, so it’s not building trust,” he continues.
Acting President Rodríguez told NBC News earlier this month that she would hold free and fair elections but declined to commit to a timeline, stating that the schedule would be determined through political dialogue. When pressed about Machado, Rodríguez said she would face legal scrutiny upon any return for calling for military intervention and sanctions.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has publicly outlined a three-phase approach for Venezuela’s future — stability, recovery, and transition to democracy — though he has declined to provide a specific timeline. During his January 28 Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, Rubio emphasized that “the end state here is we want a friendly, stable, prosperous Venezuela, and democratic, in which all elements of society are represented in free and fair elections.”
However, Rubio acknowledged the complexity of the timeline, stating, “We’re not going to get there in three weeks. It’s going to take some time.” In subsequent remarks to reporters, he added that the transition “can’t take forever” and acknowledged there must be progress within several months. However, he cautioned that “this is not a campaign to leave in place the systems currently in place.”
The Diosdado Factor
Interior Minister Cabello represents the most significant obstacle to a genuine transition. With control over security forces, intelligence services, and armed collectives, he possesses the coercive apparatus necessary to maintain regime control independent of formal governmental structures.
“Diosdado Cabello has a price imposed by the United States,” Vaquero explains. “He controls the coercive apparatus and all the internal loyalties. We’ve seen him lately. Every time he appears in Venezuelan media, he looks scared.”
The U.S. intelligence source identifies Cabello as the key figure whose removal or neutralization would be necessary for an authentic democratic opening. As long as Cabello maintains control of security forces, any political transition will be cosmetic rather than substantive.
His control extends beyond formal military and police to encompass armed civilian collectives that intimidate opposition supporters and maintain social control, operating with impunity while allowing the regime to claim official restraint.
Foreign Influence and Regional Implications
The regime’s historical relationships with Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, and China complicate transition planning. Despite keeping a low profile after Maduro’s removal, these actors continue to threaten American national security.
Bustos stresses that the presence of Hezbollah and Iranian-linked entities necessitates an extended transition period.
“The United States certainly knows about it,” he says. “I think that it’s not possible to get them out of the country really quickly.”
The re-extradition of Colombian-Venezuelan businessman Alex Saab in early February, designated by the United States as a key financial operator for Maduro, demonstrates some cooperation from regime elements with American law enforcement.
Saab’s arrest represents a significant test of cooperation with Washington. U.S. authorities accused Saab of moving approximately $350 million out of Venezuela through corrupt contracts, making him central to understanding how the regime financed itself under sanctions. His potential extradition signals Rodríguez is willing to sacrifice even Maduro’s closest financial operatives to maintain Washington’s support.
Nearly 9 million Venezuelans in the diaspora are reassessing their return prospects, yet few are making immediate plans to return. The combination of continued repression, economic uncertainty, and the presence of the same officials who forced their exile creates a wait-and-see dynamic.
Venezuelan passports cost approximately $700 on the black market when available, complicating both legal status abroad and potential return. Embassies and consulates are largely non-functional, creating a documentation crisis that traps Venezuelans in limbo regardless of whether they wish to return home or establish permanent residence elsewhere.
Strategic Implications
There is a fundamental question for Washington intelligence planners: Does the current arrangement represent a genuine transition, or is it simply the regime’s survival under American pressure? Continuing imprisonment of opposition figures and constitutional maneuvers to avoid elections suggest the former.
The official from the U.S. intelligence community notes the regime is maintaining strategic control while ensuring tactical compliance. In the absence of sustained military and economic pressure and clear benchmarks, the current government will likely continue to drag its feet on reforms for as long as possible.
The prisoner release pattern is illustrative. While hundreds have been freed, the process is opaque, reversible, and controlled entirely by Cabello’s interior ministry. As well as gag orders, those released are subject to re-arrest for hypothetical “political activity.”
Meanwhile, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino’s presentation of a golden baton to Rodríguez at a military parade in February symbolized the armed forces’ continued allegiance to Chavista structures rather than any new democratic order.
Venezuela’s situation tests the Trump administration’s approach to authoritarian transitions. Government policy toward Venezuela currently reflects a calculated preference for energy security over democratic reform. Washington views maintaining regional stability and securing oil access as more pressing strategic priorities than the unpredictable outcomes of rapid political reforms.
The Trump administration’s stated objectives for Venezuela emphasize democratic transition. Rubio told the Senate that Washington seeks “free and fair elections” where “all elements of society are represented,” noting pointedly that “you can have elections all day,” but without media access for opposition and the ability for opposition candidates to run freely, “those aren’t free and fair elections.”
Yet the administration’s actions reveal a calculated preference for energy security over rapid political reform. In the same testimony, Rubio prioritized Venezuela becoming “a friendly, stable, prosperous” partner and ending threats from “Hezbollah and Iran in our own hemisphere.”
Washington views maintaining regional stability and securing oil access as more pressing strategic priorities than the unpredictable outcomes of immediate democratic reforms. This pragmatism risks legitimizing a rebranded authoritarianism, retaining the repressive mechanisms of Maduro’s regime.
However, observers caution that this pragmatism may come at a cost in the long run. By prioritizing energy and migration management, the U.S. risks legitimizing a rebranded authoritarianism that retains the repressive mechanisms of Maduro’s regime.
Former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela James Story assessed that Rodríguez will play for time, doing “just enough to make it look as if they are complying” while waiting for U.S. focus to shift.
Venezuela’s post-Maduro transition ultimately reveals limitations of decapitation strategies against entrenched authoritarian systems. While removing Maduro eliminated the regime’s symbolic figurehead, the intelligence and security apparatus is intact.
Elections cannot occur in the short term, at least not elections meeting minimal standards of freedom and fairness. There is corruption in the electoral infrastructure, arrests of opposition figures for political activities, and the ability and leadership of those who would suppress genuine democratic opening is intact.
While the current arrangement provides tactical benefits, it also leaves strategic vulnerabilities regarding oil access and preventing a migration surge. The same figures wanted on U.S. criminal charges coordinate government functions. The same security services that tortured political prisoners manage their conditional release. The same armed collectives that intimidated voters patrol neighborhoods.
“Where Diosdado Cabello has been, obviously repression has not disappeared,” Vaquero adds. “It materializes with collectives, with social pressure, with selective judicialization. And obviously, while Diosdado remains in power, there won’t be profound change but rather tactical changes.”
The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to Editor@thecipherbrief.com for publication consideration.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business
