It has been said history does not repeat itself, but sometimes it rhymes. Today in Europe there are rhymes that resonate with the rise of a revisionist Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Although a revanchist Russia seeking to undermine and remake the post-Cold War European order is not exactly a repeat of Germany’s assault on the post-Versailles European order, there are similarities. Like Germany in the 1930s, Russia today is a once great power that now feels weakened and reigned in by antagonistic opponents. Germany in the early 1930s was economically depressed and resentful over the loss of German territory following the First World War. Today, Russia is economically stressed and deeply resentful over the loss of a greater empire. And like Nazi Germany in the 1930s, Putin’s Russia seeks to change the rules and principles which were established at the end of the Cold War. Just as Germany felt the Versailles settlement was unfairly imposed in 1919, Russia feels much the same about the post-Cold War order.
To be sure, there are significant differences. Europe under NATO and the EU is a more unified place than it was 80 years ago. EU members enjoy reasonably good economies – the problems of the southern tier countries notwithstanding – whereas Europe was in the depths of economic depression in the 1930s. Despite the rise of right-wing, nationalist parties in several EU nations and the authoritarian nature of Putin’s regime in Russia, there is nothing today like the fascist mass movements of the last century or anything remotely close to the racially driven ideology of Nazi fascism. That said, there are resonances between current events in Europe and the path to war in the 1930s.
In Nazi Germany, a rearmed and agitated country was eager to bring all German-speaking people within the greater Reich. Today, Moscow follows a similar pattern with a military modernization program and growing foreign policy assertiveness. Just as Berlin stirred up the Sudetenland Germans to undermine Czechoslovakia in 1938, Moscow has used propaganda and semi-covert military intervention to subvert Ukraine. Large Russian populations in the Baltic States offer Moscow an opportunity for even greater mischief in the future, perhaps in an attempt to gain a “corridor” of access to the strategic Kaliningrad Oblast.
The Versailles Treaty created a zone of small, independent states in eastern and central Europe. Unable to defend themselves, countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia had to depend on the distant Western Allies as ultimate guarantors of their independence. Tired from brutal fighting in World War I and the grand economic toll of the war, the Western nations were not interested in getting involved in another major war. War came anyway in 1939, but by then Czechoslovakia had been surrendered to Germany and nothing could be done to help Poland. For all the bravery and courage displayed by the Poles in the face of insurmountable odds, they were doomed by geography and the inability of the Western Allies to act with greater firmness and perspicacity.
The post-Cold War independence of the former Warsaw Pact countries, Ukraine, and other former Soviet “Republics,” created a similar situation in the 1990s, leaving those countries vulnerable to Russian pressures and dependent on the West for protection. NATO’s current disarray in the face of Russian assertiveness in Ukraine and the Baltic region is reminiscent of dithering by the Western Allies in the 1930s. Europe has become comfortable with peace since the end of the Cold War and the fabric of NATO unity is somewhat frayed. Recent Pew Research Data indicates public opinion in key NATO states is not supportive of anything stronger than economic measures against Russia. Perhaps more disturbing is the tepid public support for taking military action if another NATO member is attacked by Russia. As in the 1930s, public support for risk, much less real military action, is limited. Democratic leaders must pay attention to their constituents. Authoritarian regimes do not. NATO isn’t seeking to appease Moscow, but the relatively weak response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and semi-covert war in Ukraine will only encourage Putin. Weakness in the West is viewed as an opportunity in Moscow.
Following WWI, Americans were wary of foreign intervention, preferring to remain aloof from the overseas march of militarism and fascism during the 1930s. After being drawn into a second conflict in Europe, the U.S. built NATO and visibly committed to Europe. Today, Americans have again become skeptical of foreign involvements, and the U.S. is reluctant to take a leadership role in Europe.
The NATO alliance has provided stability and security in Europe for nearly 70 years. A NATO collapse would unravel a European order which has been immensely beneficial to the U.S. in that it sustained an independent, largely democratic, Western Europe in the face of the very real threat of the old Soviet Union. That benefit has been less relevant since the fall of the Berlin Wall. But the economic and military considerations that drove American intervention in two major wars, and the subsequent strategy of Containment against the Soviet Union, remain as valid today as they were in the 1940s. The prospect of Russia coming to dominate Europe in the near future, filling a power vacuum left in the wake of American indifference and NATO weakening, is no less threatening to our long-term national interest than it was in the late 1940s. Despite still generally favorable attitudes toward NATO, beneath the surface there are serious differences regarding how to respond to Russia’s recent actions. Combined with weak support for military responses in the event a NATO member is attacked by Russia, it does suggest the bonds of the alliance may be weakening.
Konrad Adenauer once said that history is the sum of all things that could have been avoided. History also offers the possibility of gaining insight into the present by studying the way it rhymes with the past. Russia’s behavior today and how it rhymes with Europe on the path to war in the 1930s ought to be a learning opportunity.
