British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said Thursday that an attack against a kindergarten in Ukraine is a “false flag operation designed to discredit the Ukrainians”, as reported by PA media. While there are conflicting reports about what happened, credible news agencies are reporting that they are unable to independently verify details.
Fabrication Operations (also referred to as ‘false flag operations) in war-like environments – meant to sway emotion one way or another – aren’t new, but revealing these operations by sharing intelligence is a new tactic that carries both benefit and risk.
As Western intelligence indicates that Russia is continuing to mobilize troops to Ukraine’s border, classified intelligence that once would have been closely held, is being strategically declassified and shared with reporters. The US and the UK have been uncharacteristically transparent with how they believe Russia is operating with some intelligence indicating how deployments may be operationalized in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.
It’s a proposition that could have a big payoff if it forces Russia to change its tactics, but it’s not without risk. The Cipher Brief tapped former Senior Member of the British Foreign Office Nick Fishwick for his take on the strategy.
Subscriber+ members can also access the background on this issue and insights from former DNI Jim Clapper and former CIA Acting Director John McLaughlin.
EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — I can see value in raising awareness that the Russians may be preparing to fabricate incidents as justification of intervention. There is probably nothing to be lost in letting the Russians know that the west is wise to this kind of operation. It may even slightly unsettle them. But I can’t imagine that it will be enough itself to prevent intervention if the Russians have really made up their minds to act, or even to stop the Russians fabricating an incident.
First of all, most of the non-Russian world does not – in any case – believe the idea that the present crisis is the fault of NATO aggression, so they were never likely to believe that, say, Ukraine would do anything that might provoke Russian intervention. They do not need these plots to be exposed by the US or anyone else.
Secondly, the Russian public, who have been consistently fed the line that Russia is defending itself against western aggression, will be fed whatever line Putin likes in order to to justify his actions. They will not be told anything that leads them to believe that fabrication operations are taking place, so the US assurances will either not reach them or will be heavily discredited by the Russian commentariat.
If Russia really is determined to intervene in Ukraine, I doubt that it will be deterred by the lack of a pretext for doing so. That would be a nice to have rather than a need to have.
The sharing of intelligence assessments between allies has to be a good thing. I assume that the assessments will be high level enough for there not to be a potential risk to sources. It is important in terms of the trust and unity amongst allies, and also to help establish a common understanding of the position. That understanding should not however, be based purely on intelligence; most of it will come from careful analysis of non-clandestine sources, with the intelligence adding an important dimension in certain specialised areas.
Leaders may want to make public statements which broadly reflect intelligence-based understanding but no more than that. We do not want to go back to Iraq 2002-3 where sensitive intelligence became the subject of public discourse and the apparent policy determinant. Political leaders need to know and understand the intelligence. But their views and decisions have to be based on a full range of data – not just intelligence.
Access The Us is Engaging in a Strategy to Share Intelligence on Russia more broadly. Is it Worth the Risk? This is content reserved for Subscriber+ Members
Upgrade your access to Subscriber+ today
Can the intelligence revelations be represented as scaremongering? Sure. Indeed, the Russians are never going to represent them any other way. I suspect that one of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s core competencies is his ability – and he seems pretty good at it – to ridicule the west and to reshape reality to suit President Putin and his domestic constituency.
Bottom Line: I don’t see any problem in principle with intelligence revelations so long as those doing the revealing are confident that they are true, so long as sources are not jeopardised, and the impact of the revelations, on friend and foe, has been properly anticipated. But I would counsel that friends may need some convincing that these revelations are usually such a great idea. Surprises are rarely welcomed.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, expert perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief
