Avoid Repeating Mistakes

By Karim Mezran

Karim Mezran is the Senior Resident Fellow for North Africa at the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. In addition, he is an adjunct professor of Middle East studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Previously he was director of the Center for American Studies in Rome. His recent publications include Libya: Negotiations for Transition in Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat, Libya in Political and Constitutional Transitions in North Africa: Actors and Factors, and Libya in Transition: from Jamahiriya to Jumhuriyyah? in The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World.

Five years after the Arab Spring, enough dust has settled to allow for a clear analysis of U.S. policy in Libya at the time of the Libyan revolution. The United States, and the international community as a whole, made a number of major mistakes as the revolution unfolded in 2011, which contributed to the chaos that unfolded in the country. Now, as a new unity government works to cement its control, the West must internalize lessons from the past five years in order to help the country move forward.

The first and foremost mistake made by the United States in 2011 was the failure to immediately understand the interests of its main allies, namely the United Kingdom and France. On the surface, UK and French interest in the Libyan intervention appeared to be a humanitarian need to prevent the massacre of innocent protesters in Benghazi by forces loyal to long-time dictator Moammar al Gadhafi. In reality, as it became obvious in the weeks following the adoption of UN resolutions 1970 and 1973, the two European countries intervened in order to bring about a regime change by eliminating Gadhafi and substituting his regime with one more sympathetic to them. Failing to understand this from the beginning prevented the United States from attempting to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis between the regime and the rebels, who were, at that point, still a largely unknown entity. The debate about whether the regime was willing to negotiate with the insurgents can go on forever, but the fact is that the intervening Western countries made no attempt, and did not even show bare willingness, to initiate a dialogue.  

“The Cipher Brief has become the most popular outlet for former intelligence officers; no media outlet is even a close second to The Cipher Brief in terms of the number of articles published by formers.” —Sept. 2018, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 62

Access all of The Cipher Brief’s national security-focused expert insight by becoming a Cipher Brief Subscriber+ Member.

Subscriber+

Categorized as:UncategorizedTagged with:

Related Articles

Search

Close