Reducing Cartel Violence

For almost a decade, the Mexican government has deployed the latest version of a much longer effort to address the growing threat of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). Previous phases in this effort produced two phenomena: on one hand, the strengthening, sophistication, and territorial expansion of DTOs; and on the other, a steady decline of the national homicide rate that saw its lowest levels in 2006. The undesired phenomena, the expansion of the DTOs, eventually became a real threat to national security and of international concern, particularly in the post 9/11 global scenario.

The latest phase began during the Calderon administration (2006-2012) and continues to be implemented today by the Peña Nieto administration (2012- present) without substantial modifications. This phase has mainly focused on one strategic objective: weakening the monopoly that a few, very powerful groups exerted in particular regions and corridors within Mexico. One working hypothesis underlies this strategic objective: incapacitating the leadership of DTOs would produce internal competition, institutional fragmentation, and the subsequent appearance of new players with less organizational capacity and by consequence more manageable for the state. The hypothesis has been proven right; a wealth of analysis indicates the incursion of new smaller groups on the scene. The most important downside of this strategy has been a well reported and unprecedented spike in homicides that reached its peak by 2012. Although a modest decline in homicides has been reported since, it’s clear that it is just too soon to claim that this decline is sustainable.